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INTRODUCTION  
Mobile money describes the use of mobile phones to pay bills, remit 
funds, deposit cash, and make withdrawals using e-money issued by banks 
and non-bank providers such as telecommunication companies. This 
service currently exists in over 80 developing countries and is growing 
rapidly, particularly in Africa. It is enabling many people without access to 
financial services—known as the unbanked—to access an increasing range 
of financial services, from payments, to savings and loans.  
Mobile money enables customers to use e-money, which is issued by 
an ‘e-money issuer’—usually a telecommunication company but 
sometimes a bank. While precise terminology tends to vary across 
countries and literature, e-money is typically defined as a type of stored 
value instrument or product that: (i) is issued on receipt of funds; 
(ii) consists of electronically recorded value stored on a device such as a 
server, card, or mobile phone; (iii) may be accepted as a means of payment 
by parties other than the issuer; and (iv) is convertible back into cash.
1
 The 
concepts of stored value and convertibility distinguish e-money from 
credit cards, retail gift cards, airtime, and other payment instruments that 
are not readily convertible. Customers can make payments and transfers 
by sending short message service (SMS) mobile notifications to each 
other. E-money accounts are credited when e-money is received from 
others and debited when payments are made. Customers convert their cash 
for e-money at cash merchants, which tend to be retail outlets such as 
shops and petrol stations. These customers can then use this e-money to 
make payments to each other and can later convert any remaining balance 
on their e-money account for cash.
2
  
Mobile money was launched in Kenya in 2007, and has grown very 
rapidly throughout many developing countries, particularly in Africa. 
Between 2007 and 2013, mobile money grew from nothing to a thriving 
sector with 219 live mobile money services with 61 million active 
 
 
 1. Mobile Financial Services Working Group, Mobile Financial Services: Basic Terminology, 
ALLIANCE FOR FIN. INCLUSION (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.afi-global.org/library/publications/mobile-
financial-services-basic-terminology-2013. See also K. Lauer & M. Tarazi, Supervising Nonbank E-
Money Issuers, CONSULTATIVE GRP. TO ASSIST THE POOR 1 (July 2012), http://www.cgap.org/ 
publications/supervising-nonbank-e-money-issuers 
 2. Timothy Lyman, Mark Pickens & David Porteous, Regulating Transformational Branchless 
Banking: Mobile Phones and Other Technology to Increase Access to Finance (Focus Note no. 43), 
CONSULTATIVE GRP. TO ASSIST THE POOR 3 (Jan. 15, 2008), http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/ 
CGAP-Focus-Note-Regulating-Transformational-Branchless-Banking-Mobile-Phones-and-Other-
Technology-to-Increase-Access-to-Finance-Jan-2008.pdf. 
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accounts in 84 countries.
3
 In the month of June 2013, mobile money 
customers performed 431 million transactions totalling $7.4 billion.
4
 There 
are more registered mobile money accounts than bank accounts in nine 
countries and there are now 886,000 registered agents.
5
 
Mobile money creates novel regulatory challenges because it enables a 
variety of non-banks to perform functions traditionally provided by banks. 
In particular, mobile network operators (MNOs) are increasingly 
providing payment services with little direct involvement of banks. Retail 
outlets such as shops and petrol stations are serving as ‘cash merchants’ 
that enable customers to convert their cash for e-money and vice versa, a 
conversion function traditionally provided by bank branches or automatic 
teller machines (ATMs). Prudential regulation is generally designed for 
traditional banking institutions and therefore cannot be easily applied to 
these non-banking service providers because they do not intermediate 
deposits. This raises the question of how mobile money service providers 
should be regulated.  
Regulatory frameworks need to respond to mobile money in two 
particular ways. First, regulators need to take an ‘enabling approach’, 
which involves a variety of activities that aim to help mobile money to 
grow safely. For example, in designing mobile money-related policy and 
regulation, a regulator should work closely with government departments 
(particularly those that relate to finance and development), regulators from 
other sectors (particularly telecommunications), and the mobile money 
sector.  
Second, regulators need to adopt a ‘proportionate approach’ when 
designing regulation. This means the costs of regulation to the regulator, 
market participants, and consumers should be proportionate to the benefits 
and risks of mobile money. A proportionate approach aims to guard 
against overly burdensome regulation that may stifle the development of 
this sector.  
This Article explores the challenges of translating an enabling 
proportionate regulatory approach into actual regulatory practices and 
substantive rules, using Malawi as a case study. In doing so, the Article 
 
 
 3. Claire Pénicaud & Arunjay Katakam, State of the Industry 2013: Mobile Financial Services 
for the Unbanked, GSMA (Feb. 2014), http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/ 
uploads/2014/02/SOTIR_2013.pdf. 
 4. Id. at 28. Note that ‘active accounts’ mean accounts that have been used in the last 90 days. 
Claire Pénicaud & Arunjay Katakam, State of the Industry 2013: Mobile Financial Services for the 
Unbanked, GSMA 16 (Feb. 2014), http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/ 
2014/02/SOTIR_2013.pdf.  
 5. Id. at 23.  
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aims to enrich our understanding of how we can design effective 
regulatory frameworks for mobile money.  
The Article is in five parts. Part I introduces mobile money and the 
research surrounding the enabling approach and proportionate regulation. 
Part II of this Article provides background on mobile money in Malawi. 
From there the article examines the practical challenges Malawi has faced 
in using an enabling approach and implementing proportionate regulation. 
Part III examines Malawi’s efforts at using an enabling approach, focusing 
on co-ordination among regulators and between regulators and industry, 
regulatory mandates, and understanding and building consumer demand 
for mobile money. Part IV explores Malawi’s efforts to (i) implement 
proportionate regulation in relation to the use of agents, (ii) apply a risk-
based approach to implementing anti-money laundering/countering the 
financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), (iii) protect customers’ funds, and 
(iv) regulate partnerships between MNOs and banks. Part V concludes by 
explaining how Malawi’s experiences enrich our understanding of how 
regulators can use best practice approaches such as an enabling approach 
and proportionate regulation to design effective regulatory frameworks for 
mobile money.  
I. MOBILE MONEY—A NEW FRONTIER OF FINANCIAL SERVICES  
A. The Promise of Mobile Money: Tackling Financial Exclusion 
Mobile money is an important tool for poverty reduction because it 
offers a means of addressing the impasse that exists between banks and 
poor households. Many banks do not find it economically attractive to 
make banking infrastructure and financial services available in poor 
communities.
6
 This is because high transaction costs relative to small 
transaction value sizes make it unprofitable for banks to service this 
population.
7
 Similarly, poor people can be reluctant to access formal 
financial services due to the inconvenience and high cost involved in 
accessing these services relative to the more local and informal 
alternatives they have traditionally used, as well as issues of mistrust of 
formal banking institutions.
8
 
 
 
 6. Claire Alexandre, Ignacio Mas & Daniel Radcliffe, Regulating New Banking Models That 
Can Bring Financial Services to All, 54(3) CHALLENGE 116, 118 (2010), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1664644. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. 
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For this reason, around 2.5 billion adults are currently excluded from 
the formal financial system and are subject to ‘financial exclusion.’ 9 This 
group tends to be described as the ‘unbanked.’10  
Providing the unbanked with access to financial services, known as 
‘financial inclusion’, is now recognised as an important mechanism for 
alleviating poverty and promoting a country’s broader economic 
development.
11
 Financial inclusion aims to provide the unbanked, and 
low-income households and business more generally, with a range of 
financial services that they can use to smooth their consumption and insure 
themselves against ‘economic shocks’, such as illness, accidents, theft, and 
unemployment. An economic shock can be severely detrimental to the 
unbanked’s already precarious financial position, making it more difficult 
for them to move out of poverty. In many developing countries, economic 
shocks can take a wide variety of forms beyond traditional financial or 
economic crises; they can also be health-related emergencies, crop 
failures, livestock deaths, and farming-equipment expenses.
12
 Financial 
inclusion also aims to assist the unbanked and low-income groups to save 
and borrow which in turn can enable them to invest in education and asset-
generating activities, such as enterprises.
13
  
 
 
 9. The Imperative of Financial Inclusion, UNITED NATIONS SEC'Y-GEN.’S SPECIAL ADVOCATE 
FOR INCLUSIVE FIN. FOR DEV., http://www.unsgsa.org/about/financial-inclusion (last visited Feb. 7, 
2015). Definitions that relate to people with difficulties accessing financial services can be found at: 
Elaine Kempson, Financial Services Provision and Prevention of Financial Exclusion, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION (2008), http://www.bristol.ac.uk/media-library/sites/geography/migrated/documents/ 
pfrc0807.pdf and Andrew Leyshon & N. Thrift, Geographies of Financial Exclusion: Financial 
Abandonment in Britain and the United States, 20(3) Transactions Inst. Brit. Geographers 312, 312–41 
(1995). Discussion for the reasons behind financial exclusion, particularly in regard to the lack of 
money for use of a bank account, can be found in Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Leora Klapper, Measuring 
Financial Inclusion: The Global Findex Database, THE WORLD BANK (Apr. 2012), http://elibrary. 
worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-6025. 
 10. See Who Are the Unbanked?: Uncovering the Financial Inclusion Gap, THE WORLD BANK, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGLOBALFIN/Resources/8519638-1332259343991/world_ 
bank3_Poster.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) for a discussion of the composition of the unbanked. 
 11. The focus on financial inclusion is seen in many international forums: G20 Summits, the 
Global Policy Forum (GPF) of AFI, BTCA, FATF, and the Basel Committee on Financial Inclusion.  
 12. Jake Kendall & Rodger Voorhies, The Mobile-Finance Revolution: How Cell Phones Can 
Spur Development, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2014), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140733/jake-
kendall-and-rodger-voorhies/the-mobile-finance-revolution. 
 13. For a discussion of the extensive methods that the unbanked and poor households more 
generally must take in order to deal with their liquidity and cope with economic challenges, see 
DARYL COLLINS, JONATHAN MORDUCH, STUART RUTHERFORD & ORLANDA RUTHVE, PORTFOLIOS OF 
THE POOR: HOW THE WORLD’S POOR LIVE ON $2 PER DAY (2010). See Kempson, supra note 9, at 10 
for related definitions of financial inclusion as the capacity to access and use appropriate financial 
services proposed by mainstream providers. See also Financial Inclusion, CONSULTATIVE GRP. TO 
ASSIST THE POOR (2014), http://www.cgap.org/topics/financial-inclusion; About Global Findex: 
Background, THE WORLD BANK, http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/ 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss3/7
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Proponents of mobile money argue that by using this service, 
particularly in its payments form, poor households can shift away from 
informal to formal financial services and reduce their reliance on cash.
14
 
Furthermore, once customers begin using mobile money, they can move 
from payments to accessing a range of other financial services such as 
deposits and loans. Early evidence of usage patterns of mobile money 
services provides credence to this view; however, many schemes are still 
in their infancy.
15
 For example, tentative evidence from Africa suggests 
that customers are beginning to use e-money as a form of savings by 
storing their cash with a mobile money provider (Provider).
16
 Customers 
can later withdraw that money from the Provider in a manner similar to 
withdrawing money from a bank. 
Customers are also using mobile money to access regular savings and 
loans provided by banks, primarily through partnerships between MNOs 
and banks or microfinance institutions (MFIs) (MNO-bank/MFI 
partnerships). A particularly well-established MNO-bank/MFI partnership 
operates in Kenya between Safaricom (a Vodafone subsidiary), which 
provides a mobile money product called ‘M-Pesa’, and the Commercial 
Bank of Africa (CBA).
17
 Collectively, Safaricom and CBA provide ‘M-
Shwari.’18 This product works in the following way: M-Shwari customers 
can access savings by transferring funds from their mobile money account 
 
 
EXTRESEARCH/EXTPROGRAMS/EXTFINRES/EXTGLOBALFIN/0,,contentMDK:23172730~page
PK:64168182~piPK:64168060~theSitePK:8519639,00.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
 14. Arguments about the benefits of shifting away from cash that relate to cost savings, 
transparency, speed and security, financial inclusion, new market access and economic development 
can be found at: Why Shift to Electronic Payments, BETTER THAN CASH ALLIANCE, 
http://betterthancash.org/why-e-payments (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). For a discussion of the ways in 
which customers can leverage mobile money for other financial services, see discussion of the ‘ladder 
of financial inclusion’ in Ignacio Mas & Colin Mayer, Payments: Innovations on Mobile Money 
Platforms (Sept. 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1825122. 
 15. See, e.g., Tilman Ehrbeck & Michael Tarazi, Putting the Banking in Branchless Banking: 
Regulation and the Case for Interest-Bearing and Insured E-money Savings Accounts, in THE MOBILE 
FINANCIAL SERVICES DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011 37 (World Economic Forum ed., 2011); Dan 
Radcliffe & Rodger Voorhies, A Digital Pathway to Financial Inclusion, Bill & Melinda Gates Found. 
12 (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2186926. 
 16. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Mobile Money for Business Development in the East 
African Community: A Comparative Study of Existing Platforms and Regulations, 27, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/DTL/STICT/2012/2 (2012), available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtlstict 
2012d2_en.pdf.  
 17. Vodafone Media, Safaricom Launches M-Shwari—Offering Interest and Loans—On M-Pesa, 
VODAFONE (Nov. 2012), http://www.vodafone.com/content/index/media/vodafone-group-releases/ 
2012/m-shwari.html>.  
 18. There are several other examples. For example, in Papua New Guinea, Monit Plus partnered 
with Mobile SMK to provide small loans to customers. Loans made easy with mobileSMK, PACIFIC 
FINANCIAL INCLUSION PROGRAMME, http://www.pfip.org/media-centre/in-news/2011-1/loans-made-
easy-with-mobilesmk.html. 
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with Safaricom to a linked bank deposit provided by CBA.
19
 Customers 
can also access loans through M-Shwari as Safaricom stores information 
on the payment history of customers of its M-Pesa product, and 
determines a credit score based on that history.
20
 The CBA then uses this 
score to assess the creditworthiness of customers
21
 and to provide loans to 
customers deemed creditworthy.
22
 ‘Good’ borrowers are also able to 
graduate and access larger loan facilities.
23
 Similar partnerships exist in 
Ghana, Tanzania, and Malawi.
24
  
B. The Regulatory Challenge: An Enabling Approach and Proportionate 
Regulation  
As an area that currently operates largely outside the regulatory 
protections of traditional banking services, mobile money generates a 
variety of risks which raise the question of how the sector should be 
regulated. For example, in May 2012, it emerged that employees of Telco 
MTN Uganda had stolen around $3.5 million from an account used to 
store cash which had been incorrectly sent through its mobile money 
service.
25
 Further, in January 2014, Safaricom blacklisted 140,000 users 
after they defaulted on their M-Shwari loans.
26
 As mobile money 
continues to grow, mobile money providers will hold ever larger amounts 
of customers’ funds. The loss of such funds will have a greater impact on 
the local economy and cause increased economic hardship to individual 
mobile money account holders, undermining the objective of broadening 
financial inclusion. It may also increase the costs of using mobile money 
 
 
 19. Id.  
 20. Simone di Castri, Tiered Risked-Based KYC: M-Shwari Successful Customer Due Diligence, 
GSMA (July 8, 2013), http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/tiered-risk-based-kyc-m-shwari-
successful-customer-due-diligence.  
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Arunjay Katakam, Mobile Credit and Savings Services Gaining Traction Using Different 
Models, GSMA (July 17, 2014), http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/mobile-credit-and-
savings-services-gaining-traction-using-different-models. 
 25. See Jeff Mbanga, Uganda: How MTN Lost Mobile Billions, THE OBSERVER (May 24, 2012), 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201205250847.html. See also Steve Candia, Cyber Crime Increases by 14 
percent: Police Report, THE NEW VISION (Aug. 2, 2013), http://allafrica.com/stories/20130 
8050195.html; Winfred Kagwe, Safaricom Gains Big in SIM Switch-offs, THE STAR (Aug. 1, 2013) 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201308011261.html. 
 26. George Ngigi, CBA Blacklists 140,000 Safaricom loans defaulters, BUS. DAILY (Jan. 26, 
2014), http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/CBA-blacklists-140-000-Safaricom-loans-defaulters/-/539 
552/2161116/-/7f5cqez/-/index.html. 
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services as losses will be passed on to customers, which may also 
undermine its use in banking the unbanked. 
Existing financial system and banking regulations are unlikely to be 
directly appropriate to mobile money systems because they are aimed at 
financial institutions, particularly banks, rather than the MNOs and cash 
merchants that are central to mobile money. Two concepts have been 
identified as particularly important to developing the effective regulation 
of mobile money. 
1. An Enabling Approach 
The first is an enabling approach in relation to regulatory objectives 
and activities. In established banking markets, regulators are in general 
required to monitor and reduce risks caused by the activities of banks and 
other financial service providers. In contrast, in many countries in which 
mobile money is operating, regulators are also assigned the objective of 
extending banking and financial services to poor households, particularly 
the unbanked, or, in other words, of promoting financial inclusion. This 
regulatory objective is becoming increasingly common: regulators and 
central banks in over 60 countries have either a dedicated financial 
inclusion strategy, financial inclusion as part of their institutional mandate, 
or a dedicated financial inclusion unit in their regulatory institution.
27
 
Examples include Malaysia, Nigeria, Brazil, and India.
28
 The mandate of 
 
 
 27. See, e.g., Dr Subir Gokarn, Financial Inclusion—A Consumer Centric View (Mar. 21, 2011), 
available at http://rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_SpeechesView.aspx?Id=555; Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Consumer 
Protection and Financial Education (Apr. 5, 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/review/ 
r110405c.pdf; Penelope Hawkins, Financial Access and Financial Stability, in CENTRAL BANKS AND 
THE CHALLENGE FOR DEVELOPMENT 65–79 (Bank for Int’l Settlements ed., 2006); Alfred Hannig, 
Global Trends and Challenges on Financial Inclusion 7 (June 20 2013), available at http://www.afi-
global.org/library/publications/afi-executive-director-alfred-hannigs-presentation-iadi-international. A 
list of institutions and their commitments can be found from page 18 onwards in the Maya Declaration 
2013 Progress Report: Putting Financial Inclusion on the Global Map: The 2013 Maya Declaration 
Progress Report, ALLIANCE FOR FIN. INCLUSION 18 (Sep. 2013), http://www.fgda.org/dati/Content 
Manager/files/Documenti_microfinanza/Afi-2013-Maya-Progress-Report.pdf. See also Financial 
Access 2010: The State of Financial Inclusion Through the Crisis, CGAP & THE WORLD BANK 17 
(Sept. 2010), http://www.microrate.com/media/docs/general/FA_2010_Financial_Access_ 2010_Rev. 
pdf. 
 28. Nigeria: National Financial Inclusion Strategy, CENT. BANK OF NIGERIA (Oct. 23, 2012), 
http://www.cenbank.org/Out/2012/CCD/Launching%20of%20the%20Nigeria's%20National%20Finan
cial%20Inclusion%20Strategy.pdf; Brazil: Action Plan to Strengthen the Institutional Environment, 
BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL (May 2012), http://www.bcb.gov.br/Nor/relincfin/Brazil_Financial_ 
Inclusion_Action_Plan.pdf. The Reserve Bank of India has included financial inclusion in its mandate 
since the Annual Report of 20052006. See, e.g., Dr KC Chakrabaty, Financial Inclusion: A Road 
India Needs to Travel, RESERVE BANK OF INDIA (Oct. 12, 2011), http://rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_ 
SpeechesView.aspx?Id=607. 
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financial inclusion is usually aligned with and pursued in tandem with 
efforts to achieve financial stability, integrity, and consumer protection 
because they are seen as complementary objectives. 
In order to promote financial inclusion, regulators are encouraged to 
engage in an ‘enabling approach’ to designing regulatory arrangements 
that are required for mobile money to develop. This differs from the 
traditional role of regulators, particularly central banks.
29
 An enabling 
regulatory approach aims to permit market players to explore different 
outsourcing arrangements and products in order to provide an environment 
in which innovation and growth are encouraged.
30
An example of an 
enabling approach to regulation involves a regulator—particularly a 
banking regulator or central bank—extending its mandate to include 
mobile money and then working with government ministries, the mobile 
money sector, and regulators from other sectors, particularly 
telecommunications, to build understanding of the sector and to foster 
consumer demand for mobile money.
31
 As Alfred Hannig, the Executive 
Director of the Alliance for Financial Inclusion, an organisation consisting 
of regulators from 90 countries, noted in November 2013, this changing 
role of central banks, particularly in emerging countries, is “reshaping the 
approach of central banking.”32  
 
 
 29. Eva G. Gutierrez & Sondeep Singh, What Regulatory Frameworks Are More Conducive to 
Mobile Banking? Empirical Evidence from Findex Data (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper 
No. 6652, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2338858. These authors cite D. Porteous, The 
Enabling Environment for Mobile Banking in Africa, Dep’t for Int’l Dev. (2006), 
http://bankablefrontier.com/wp-content/uploads/documents/ee.mobil_.banking.report.v3.1.pdf; David 
Porteous, Mobilizing Money through Enabling Regulation, 4(1) INNOVATIONS 75 (2009). 
 30. See, e.g., David Porteous, The Enabling Environment for Mobile Banking in Africa, supra 
note 29, at 4; Simone di Castri, Mobile Money: Enabling Regulatory Solutions, GSMA (Feb. 2013), 
http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/MMU-Enabling-Regulatory-
Solutions-di-Castri-2013.pdf; Gutierrez & Singh, supra note 29, at 4. 
 31. Pierre-Laurent Chatain et al., Protecting Mobile Money Against Financial Crimes: Global 
Policy Challenges and Solutions, WORLD BANK 112 (2011), https://openknowledge.world 
bank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2269/600600PUB0ID181Mobile09780821386699.pdf?sequence=1. 
 32. Alfred Hannig, Developing Countries Focused on Financial Inclusion are Reshaping Central 
Banking, ALLIANCE FOR FIN. INCLUSION (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.afi-global.org/blog/2013/11/ 
25/developing-countries-focused-financial-inclusion-are-reshaping-central-banking. 
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2. Proportionate Regulation  
The second issue relates to the substantive content of the regulation. 
Generally, a proportionate approach is encouraged, in which “the costs to 
the regulator, the institutions, and the consumers are proportionate to the 
risks being addressed, taking into consideration as well the anticipated 
benefits.”
33
  
Proportionate regulation is seen as crucial for markets in the early 
stages of development where innovation and growth in financial services 
and products promise greater financial inclusion. A proportionate 
approach to regulation is important in enabling banks, MNOs, and cash 
merchants to work together to serve poor households on a profitable basis 
in these markets and to expand services.
34
  
C. Malawi: Implementing an Enabling Approach and Proportionate 
Regulation  
Malawi provides a useful case study of a country seeking to implement 
these approaches. The mobile money sector in Malawi is relatively new as 
it was launched only in early 2012, and Malawi is therefore facing the 
same market and regulatory challenges that are confronting other 
countries.
35
 In doing so, regulators in Malawi, particularly the Reserve 
Bank of Malawi (RBM), have adopted an enabling approach and 
proportionate regulation. Malawi’s experiences in the development of the 
mobile money sector and its regulation therefore provide insight into the 
practical challenges involved in implementing this approach.  
 
 
 33. Kate Lauer & Michael Tarazi, Supervising Nonbank E-Money Issuers, CONSULTATIVE GRP. 
TO ASSIST THE POOR 1 (Jul. 2012), http://www.cgap.org/publications/supervising-nonbank-e-money-
issuers; Beth Jenkins, Developing Mobile Money Ecosystems, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL 22–23 
(2008), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/papers/jenkins_mobile_money_summer_008.pdf. 
 34. Regulatory freedom is considered a key reason for the development of M-Pesa in Kenya. See 
Ignacio Mas & Daniel Radcliffe, Mobile Payments Go Viral: M-Pesa in Kenya, in YES AFRICA CAN: 
SUCCESS STORIES FROM A DYNAMIC CONTINENT 353–70 (Punam Chuham‐Pole & Manka Angwafo 
eds., 2011); Mwangi S. Kimenyi & Njuguna S. Ndung’u, Expanding the Financial Services Frontier: 
Lessons from Mobile Phone Banking in Kenya, BROOKINGS INST. 6–7 (Oct. 16, 2009), 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2009/10/16-mobile-phone-kimenyi. See also Alexandre, 
Mas & Radcliffe, supra note 8, at 122 for a discussion of regulatory freedom for non-bank e-money 
issuers to raise deposits and process payments. 
 35. See Claire Alexandre & Lynn Chang Eisenhart, Mobile Money as an Engine of Financial 
Inclusion and Lynchpin of Financial Integrity, 8 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 285, 296 (2013) for a 
discussion of number of the pressing market and regulatory challenges in mobile money.  
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This Article draws on a broader study that examined the mobile money 
market and its regulation in Malawi.
36
 This study’s objective was to assist 
the development of an enabling legal and regulatory environment for 
market players and end-users in Malawi’s mobile money space, thereby 
encouraging that space to grow and develop. To do so, the study 
undertook desk-based research which followed methodology established 
by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) for its Branchless 
Banking Diagnostic Template (CGAP Template).
37
 The research team 
updated the CGAP Template to reflect recent policy developments on 
mobile money regulation and to focus on four specific issues being 
examined by the authors’ broader international mobile money research 
project.
38
 
The study also reviewed existing reports detailing recommendations for 
mobile money in Malawi. These reports included: USAID, Scaling Usage 
of Mobile Money to Boost Financial Inclusion in Malawi: Summary 
Action Plan (November 2011); USAID, Demand for Mobile Money 
Services: Survey Results and Report (November 2011); and FinMark 
Trust, Mapping the Retail Payment Services Landscape: Malawi (October 
2012).
39
  
 
 
 36. Jonathan Greenacre, Louise Malady & Ross Buckley, The Regulation of Mobile Money in 
Malawi Project Report (Mar. 2014), http://www.clmr.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/files/attached_files/ 
the_regulation_of_mobile_money_in_malawi_project_report.pdf [hereinafter Malawi Report]. The 
only citation we can provide for this, and similar references throughout this paper, is a page 
reference to the Malawi Report. This is because, unless otherwise marked with secondary sources, we 
wrote the Malawi Report using primary data which one of our researchers obtained during interviews 
in Malawi in December 2013. Ethics restrictions at our university mean we are unable to share 
this primary data, including details of the interviewees, beyond our research team. 
 37. Branchless Banking Diagnostic Template, CONSULTATIVE GRP. TO ASSIST THE POOR 
(2010), http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-Branchless-Banking-Diagnostic-Template-Feb-
2010.pdf. This template was developed using various earlier diagnostic processes and models between 
2006 and 2009 and released publically in 2010.  
 38. The project is being undertaken at the University of New South Wales' Faculty of Law. 
Several academics and development agencies throughout the world (World Bank, USAID, United 
Nations, and the Alliance for Financial Inclusion) are currently studying legal and regulatory issues for 
mobile money. In order to add to this developing knowledge base, and importantly, avoid duplicating 
research efforts, our project has identified four key legal and regulatory issues in relation to mobile 
money which to focus upon. These are:  
Protection of customers’ funds; 
Agents—legal and regulatory considerations; 
Applying a risk-based approach when implementing AML/CFT measures for mobile money; 
and 
The role of the regulator in understanding and building consumer demand for mobile money. 
 39. Scaling Usage of Mobile Money to Boost Financial Inclusion in Malawi: Summary Action 
Plan, USAID (Nov. 30, 2011), http://egateg.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/Malawi_MM_Action_ 
Plan_FINAL.pdf; Demand for Mobile Money Services, USAID (Nov. 30, 2011), http://egateg. 
usaid.gov/sites/default/files/Demand%20for%20Mobile%20Money%20Services_Malawi_FINAL.pdf; 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss3/7
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Fieldwork was also undertaken in order to understand Malawi’s ‘local 
context’, including its regulatory approach and reasons for any departure 
from internationally accepted norms. Fieldwork was undertaken from 5—
22 December 2013 which involved interviews with staff at the RBM, the 
Ministry of Finance, MFIs, MNOs, researchers, regulatory and policy 
coordinating groups, and development partners. The study’s report was 
publically released on 4 July 2014.
40
  
II. BACKGROUND ON MALAWI  
Landlocked in southeast Africa, Malawi’s population is almost 
17 million,
41
 85 percent of which live in rural areas.
42
 Malawi also has a 
young population: about 65 percent of the population is aged under 24 
years.
43
 The country has relatively high literacy levels: 74.8 percent of the 
population (age 15 and over) can read and write.
44
 In 2012, Malawi’s 
Human Development Index was valued at 0.418 (placing Malawi in the 
‘low human development’ category), ranking 170 out of 187 countries and 
territories.
45
 The country’s Gross National Income per head is $320.46 
Around 90 percent of the population is involved in agriculture,
47
 and 
foreign aid comprises just over a quarter of total Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP).
48
 Around three quarters of the population live below the 
international severe poverty line ($1.25/day).
49
 Life expectancy is low 
(around 53 years), infant mortality is high (77 in 1000), and there are 
limited health care resources (just over one hospital bed per 1000 people).  
 
 
Ahmed Dermish, Joel Phiri, & Caitlin Sanford, Mapping the Retail Payment Services Landscape: 
Malawi, FINMARK TRUST (Oct. 2012), http://www.finmark.org.za/wp-content/uploads/pubs/Rep_ 
RPS_landscape_Malawi_2012.pdf [hereinafter FinMark Report]. 
 40. Malawi Report, supra note 36 
 41. Malawi: The World Factbook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Jan. 6, 2014), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mi.html.  
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Human Development Report 2013: Malawi, UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME (Jan. 7, 
2014), http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/MWI.pdf.  
 46. Malawi Data, THE WORLD BANK (2014), data.worldbank.org/country/Malawi. 
 47. Malawi: The World Factbook, supra note 41. 
 48. Malawi Economic Stats, NATIONMASTER (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.nationmaster.com/ 
country-info/profiles/Malawi/Economy. 
 49. Malawi Statistics, UNICEF (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/malawi_ 
statistics.html.  
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An estimated 81 percent of Malawians do not have access to an 
account with a formal financial institution
50
 and statistics suggest that 
Malawi has limited financial infrastructure.
51
 In 2012, penetration of 
banking infrastructure per 100,000 adults was as follows: 
 Bank branches: 1 (166 in the country); 
 Automatic teller machines (ATMs): 1.9 (300); 
 Post offices: 2.4 (380); and 
 Agents: 12.6 (around 2,000).52 
Cash remains the most dominant form of payment mechanism and 
remittances were an important source of income for many Malawians.
53
 
Popular remittance methods were the Malawi Postal Corporation’s (MPC) 
FastCash service or through minibus drivers for domestic remittances.
54
 
FastCash is a domestic and international remittance service which also 
includes bill payments.
55
 In 2012, the MPC had an extensive network of 
330 branches throughout Malawi.
56
 
This limited formal financial infrastructure and reliance on basic 
remittance channels indicates that mobile money could be embraced by 
many Malawians as an alternative means of accessing formal financial 
services. From a strategic, policy perspective for expanding financial 
inclusion, consideration may need to be given to how the mobile money 
infrastructure will be established and become viable alongside existing 
infrastructure such as that operated by the MPC for FastCash. 
A. Telecommunication Infrastructure & Mobile Phone Penetration 
Four operatorsBharti Airtel (Airtel), Telekom Networks Malawi 
Limited (TNM), Access Communications Limited (ACL), and Malawi 
Telecommunications Limited (MTL)offer fixed and mobile telephone 
 
 
 50. See RBM, Malawi National Payment Systems Vision and Strategy Framework for the Period 
2014 to 2018 7 (Dec. 2013) (Payment System Vision for 2014–2018). 
 51. FinMark Trust, Mapping the Retail Payment Services Landscape: Malawi, FINMARK 
TRUST 8–9 (Oct. 2012), http://www.finmark.org.za/wp-content/uploads/pubs/RPSRegional_Report_ 
MMZZ133.pdf. 
 52. Finmark Report, supra note 39, at 10. 
 53. Id at 36. 
 54. Id. at 9. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. at 14. 
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services in Malawi.
57
 Estimates suggest that approximately 90 percent of 
the Malawian population is covered by a mobile signal, and that mobile 
penetration is approximately 33 percent, of which 45 percent is rural based 
and 55 percent urban based.
58
 While mobile penetration rates are much 
lower than in many other countries,
59
 the rate is higher than the percentage 
of people who have access to formal financial services (19 percent).
60
 This 
suggests that mobile phones could be used as an access point by much of 
the population for formal financial services, thereby increasing financial 
inclusion. However, the scope for this to occur may in reality be 
constrained by the fragility of mobile networks in Malawi’s rural areas, 
and high tariffs on internet and mobile phone services.
61
  
B. Mobile Money Providers in Malawi 
At the time of writing, mobile money was being provided by two 
MNOs: Airtel and TNM
62
. Airtel launched Airtel Money (or ‘Khusa 
M'manja’) on 29 February 2012.63 Airtel Money provides payment 
services including: cash in and out, remittances, top-ups for airtime, and 
insurance.
64
 International non-government organisations such as Save the 
Children and the World Food Program have used Airtel mobile money to 
distribute cash subsidies to Malawian families. TNM, a mobile company, 
 
 
 57. Lewis Kalasawa, Mobile and Cyberthreat Issues, 4 (Sept. 10–12, 2013). More details on the 
telecommunications sector can be found in a recent report: Malawi—Telecoms, Mobile, Broadband 
and Forecasts, BUDDECOMM (2014), http://www.budde.com.au/Research/Malawi-Telecoms-Mobile-
Broadband-and-Forecasts.html.  
 58. Kalasawa, supra note 57, at 4. 
 59. The Little Data Book on Information and Communication Technology, WORLD BANK & 
INT’L TELECOMMS. UNION 12 (2012), http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/little_date_book_ 
ict_2014.pdf. 
 60. Id. at 9. 
 61. See Edwin Saidi, Mobile Opportunities Mobile Problems: Assessing Mobile Commerce 
Implementation Issues in Malawi, 14 J INTERNET BANK & COMM 5, 8 (2009), available at 
http://www.arraydev.com/commerce/jibc/2009-04/Saidi.pdf. Saidi refers to poor mobile network 
infrastructure in Malawi. Id. See also Kalasawa, supra note 57, at 4–7: Kalasawa refers to the 
existence of several problems in relation to mobile and internet use, namely, unsatisfactory and 
intermittent mobile service quality, high tariffs on internet and mobile phones, poor customer service, 
and low internet connectivity. Id. 
 62. Lewis Kalasawa, Fifth Annual African Consumer Protection Dialogue Conference: Mobile 
and Cyberthreat Issues (Sept. 2013), at 6. 
 63. Bharti Airtel is an Indian multinational telecommunications company that purchased the 
African operations of the Kuwaiti mobile company Zain (including Malawi) in 2010. John Ribeiro, 
India’s Bharti Airtel Completes Acquisition of Zain Africa, PCWORLD (June 8, 2010), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/198287/article.html. 
 64. Airtel provides the insurance service in partnership with Smile Life Insurance company: 
Rogers Siula, Airtel Malawi and Smile Life Insurance in Partnership, NYASATIMES (2012), 
http://mobilemoneyafrica.com/details.php?post_id=689. 
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launched TNM Mobile Money on 2 May 2013.
65
 TNM Mobile Money 
enables remittances, bill payments, cash in and out, top-ups for airtime, 
salary payments, and insurance.
66
  
Data suggests that around 10 percent of total mobile phone users in 
Malawi use or have mobile money accounts.
67
 Airtel and TNM are now 
partnering with banks and MFIs to add greater depth to mobile money 
product offerings and to leverage existing agent networks established by 
banks and MFIs (MNO-bank/MFI partnerships).
68
 These partnership 
initiatives should lead to further growth in mobile money in Malawi. In 
such partnerships, customers with a mobile money account with the MNO 
and a deposit account with the partner bank or MFI are able to transfer 
money between these accounts.
69
 For example, Airtel operates a 
partnership like this with the MFI Opportunity Bank.
70
 TNM is similarly 
piloting a partnership with First Merchant Bank.
71
 A number of 
international organisations are active in helping to extend the reach of 
mobile money in Malawi, such as the Mobile Money for the Poor 
(MM4P), US Agency for Development (USAID), the World Bank, and 
Family Health International 360 (FHI 360).
72
 For example, the USAID-
funded Mobile Money Accelerator Program provided by FHI 360 plans to 
pilot a service providing teacher payments through mobile money.
73
   
 
 
 65. The service is also called ‘Mpamba’, a local language name meaning ‘Start-up Capital.’ TNM 
Launches Mobile Banking, FACE OF MALAWI (May 3, 2013), http://www.faceofmalawi.com/2013/05/ 
tnm-launches-mobile-banking.  
 66. TNM provides this insurance service in partnership with Nico Life Insurers. See Nico Life 
and TNM (Aug. 2013), available at http://www.nico-life.com/pdfs/TNM-Moyo-Cover-1-Aug-2013-
Corporate-Presentation.pdf. 
 67. This estimate is based on data estimates: assuming 33 percent of population has a mobile 
phone (or 5.5 million people; see data quoted above) and MNOs mobile money customer base is 
between 0.4-0.5 million. 
 68. Malawi Report, supra note 36, at 13. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id.  
 72. MM4P aims to assist in scaling up sustainable branchless and mobile financial services that 
reach the poor in very low-income countries. Mobile Money for the Poor, UNITED NATIONS CAPITAL 
DEV. FUND, http://www.uncdf.org/en/MM4P (last visited Feb. 7, 2014). It does so by providing 
financial and technical support providers and agents, supporting market and client research, bringing 
large scale users into the branchless and mobile financial services system, and assisting central banks 
to create an enabling environment for branchless and mobile financial services. Id. MM4P is funded by 
the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), Sida (a Swedish government agency), 
AusAID, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Id. 
 73. Id.  
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C. Challenges to Growth 
Both MNOs are encountering challenges in expanding their mobile 
money services, particularly in rural areas.
74
 Low levels of financial 
literacy have been identified as a key issue for MNOs when selecting and 
training agents.
75
 This, along with other well documented issues
76
 which 
are commonly experienced in building agent networks in emerging 
countries, has led to MNOs committing considerable resources to the 
building of agent networks.
77
 This situation may have restricted the 
MNOs’ expansion of agent networks in Malawi. 
Challenges faced by MNOs in expanding the customer base for mobile 
money services include low levels of financial literacy and limited trust.
78
 
Many Malawians in rural areas have never used banks and consequently 
do not sufficiently trust financial services to take up mobile money.
79
 The 
absence of a national identification system can also make it difficult for 
MNOs and agents to comply with know your customer (KYC) 
requirements for the unbanked.
80
 Additionally, MNOs find it difficult to 
establish profitable business models with customers who often have very 
small incomes, and there is a relatively low penetration rate of mobile 
phones.
81
 As noted above, only around a third of Malawians have a mobile 
phone.
82
 Finally, limited infrastructure in remote rural areas means that 
some Malawians may need to travel long distances simply to charge their 
phones, which reduces the convenience that mobile money may be 
otherwise able to offer.
83
  
D. Regulators Involved in Mobile Money 
The regulation of mobile money involves a number of government 
bodies and regulators. In Malawi, the RBM is the lead regulator for mobile 
 
 
 74. See FinMark Report, supra note 39, at 3; USAID Action Plan, supra note 39, at 14; and 
USAID Survey Results, supra note 39. 
 75. Id. at 14. 
 76. See, e.g., Mobile Money War: RBZ Movies In, THE STANDARD (Mar. 2, 2014), 
http://www.thestandard.co.zw/2014/03/02/mobile-money-war-rbz-moves for an explanation of the 
issues in this article focusing on the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe’s (RBZ) directive for mobile money 
operators to seek RBZ’s permission prior to entering into exclusive agreements with agents. 
 77. See supra note 74.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Id.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Kalasawa, supra note 57, at 4. 
 83. Malawi Report, supra note 36, at 14. 
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money and is now focused on developing and formalising the overarching 
regulatory framework for the mobile money sector.
84
 The Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) is involved in the strategic policy development for mobile 
money as part of its broader role in improving financial inclusion in the 
country.
85
 A range of other regulators in Malawi are also exploring and 
developing regulatory responses to the mobile money market, including 
regulators from the following sectors: telecommunications, competition, 
consumer protection, and anti-money laundering and countering the 
financing of terrorism.
86
  
RBM has a mandate to promote and oversee Malawi’s national 
payments system,
87
 and it is under these auspices that it is responsible for 
overseeing the mobile money sector.
88
 The Payments Department at the 
RBM takes the lead in the supervision and regulation of the sector.
89
 It 
also takes the lead on coordinating efforts for RBM with a number of other 
regulatory institutions as described below (see Policy and Regulatory 
Coordination). The Bank Supervision Department of the RBM is involved 
in mobile money through its contribution to the work of the E-Banking 
Task Force.
90
 It is also considering regulatory responses to the growing 
number of MNO-bank/MFI partnerships.
91
 The Micro-finance and Capital 
Markets Department (RBM-MF/CM Department) is involved in 
developing consumer demand for mobile money.
92
  
By promoting financial sector development and financial inclusion, the 
MOF has contributed to the growth of mobile money. RBM’s focus on 
developing an enabling regulatory framework to encourage the use of 
mobile money aims to give effect to the MOF’s goals for financial 
inclusion. These goals are contained in several strategic policy documents, 
which are discussed in Part II.F, below.  
There are also several other regulators involved in the operation of 
mobile money in Malawi. The Malawi Communications Regulatory 
Authority (MACRA) regulates the postal, telecommunications, and 
 
 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id at 14–15. 
 87. Reserve Bank of Malawi Act 1989, § 4(e) (Malawi), available at http://www.malawilii.org/ 
files/mw/legislation/consolidated-act/44:02/rboma4402219_pdf_20081.pdf.  
 88. Reserve Bank of Malawi Act 1989, section 4(e) (RBM Act): as amended by the Reserve 
Bank of Malawi Act 2010. 
 89. Malawi Report, supra note 36, at 15. 
 90. Id.; Communications Act 1998 § 3.  
 91. Malawi Report, supra note 36, at 15. 
 92. Id. 
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broadcasting sectors.
93
 It is responsible for administering the 
Communications Act 1998.
94
 In order to provide mobile money services, 
an MNO must have a licence from MACRA under this Act.
95
 The 
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) is an autonomous central national agency 
reporting directly to the Minister of Finance.
96
 The FIU has wide ranging 
powers in relation to combating money laundering and terrorist 
financing.
97
 The Competition and Fair Trading Commission (CFTC) 
examines competition and consumer protection issues and its role may 
become more prominent in mobile money in response to MNO-banks/MFI 
partnerships.
98
  
E. Regulatory Coordination 
There are significant efforts directed towards coordinating regulatory 
approaches for mobile money in Malawi. These coordinated efforts 
support Malawi’s move towards establishing an enabling legal and 
regulatory environment for mobile money. The coordinated regulatory 
approaches led by RBM are evidenced through industry bodies such as the 
National Payments Council (NPC) and through RBM’s internal intra-
departmental task force, the E-Banking Task Force. RBM, along with 
other regulators, industry players, and donor partners also facilitates 
coordination between regulators and industry through the Mobile Money 
Consultative Group (MMCG). 
 
 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id.  
 95. Communications Act 1998, § 3 (Malawi), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/ 
text.jsp?file_id=222361. 
 96. Id.  
 97. These include the power to ‘enter into contracts, responsible for receiving, requesting, 
analysing and disseminating to competent authorities disclosures of financial information as required 
under this Act in order to counter money laundering and financing of terrorism’: AML/CFT Act, § 11 
(Malawi), available at https://www.rbm.mw/documents/pisu/Money%20Laundering%20Act% 
202006.pdf. Note that ‘competent authority’ means ‘the Director of Public Prosecutions, and includes 
any person authorized by him in that behalf’: AML/CFT Act, § 2 (Malawi), available at 
https://www.rbm.mw/documents/pisu/Money%20Laundering%20Act%202006.pdf. There are also 
several other important institutions involved in AML/CFT, however their work does not directly relate 
to KYC for mobile money and so they are not specifically considered here. These institutions include 
the National Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Committee, the 
Malawi Police Service, the Director of Public Prosecutions, and the National Counter Terrorism 
Committee. Furthermore, Malawi is a member of the regional group called the Eastern and Southern 
Africa Antimoney Laundering Group.  
 98. Id. at 16.  
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The NPC consists of RBM and a range of banks and finance 
companies.
99
 It is designed to encourage cooperation in modernising 
Malawi’s payments systems by providing a forum for the exchange of 
ideas.
100
 The E-Banking Task Force is an intra-departmental group made 
up of the following RBM departments: banking, payments, internal audit, 
information and communication, exchange control, and debt 
management.
101
 This Task Force was formed to regulate and guide the 
mobile payment services sector, and it played a key role in developing the 
initial guidelines for mobile money: the Mobile Guidelines.
102
 The MMCG 
is an external inter-agency group made up of a variety of regulators, 
donors, banks, and the two MNOs.
103
 MMCG aims to strengthen the use of 
mobile money in Malawi by facilitating and incorporating the views of a 
variety of stakeholders (policy, regulatory, and market) into regulation and 
policy objectives for mobile money.
104
 The MMCG is also involved in a 
variety of other issues including: financial literacy education, pilot 
programs for government to person (G2P), and social cash transfers.
105
 In 
January 2014, it was announced that a study would be conducted into the 
MMCG which would explore moving the MMCG from an institution 
funded by USAID to an autonomous body.
106
 
A number of other informal and formal mechanisms are also used by 
regulators in Malawi to establish coordinated efforts with respect to 
mobile money development. For example, the RBM Payments Department 
coordinates with the MOF to ensure that its payments system development 
 
 
 99. For membership list of NPC, see The Payment System in Malawi, BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS 63, http://www.bis.org/cpss/paysys/Malawi.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
 100. For membership list of NPC see Bank for International Settlements (BIS), The Payment 
System in Malawi, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS 63, http://www.bis.org/cpmi/paysys/ 
malawi.pdf. 
 101. Malawi Report, supra note 36, at 16. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Press reports indicate MMCG members are drawn from the World Bank, RBM, Bankers 
Association of Malawi, Malawi Microfinance Network, MACRA, and the MOF. See, for example, 
John D. Villasenor, Darrell M. West & Robin J. Lewis, The 2015 Brookings Financial and Digital 
Inclusion Project Report, BROOKINGS 77 (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/ 
research/files/reports/2015/08/financial-digital-inclusion-2015-villasenor-west-lewis/fdip2015.pdf. If 
this is the case, the MMCG would appear to form the basis of a very useful collaborative effort for 
mobile money in Malawi given the range of expertise being brought to the table. See Kenya 
Transferred $22bn Via Mobile Money—CBK, SCI. & TECH. WORLD (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www. 
ventures-africa.com/2014/01/kenya-transferred-22bn-via-mobile-money-cbk. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  
 106. Malawi to Set Up Mobile Money Co-ordination Group, TELECOMPAPER (Jan. 2012), 
http://www.telecompaper.com/news/malawi-to-set-up-mobile-money-coordination-group--992760. 
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is consistent with MOF’s broader strategies for the financial system.107 A 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) operates between RBM, the 
MOF, and MACRA which states that all three institutions will have input 
into mobile money regulation.
108
 Additional MOUs operate between RBM 
and MACRA, and RBM and FIU.
109
 The FIU is responsible for 
compliance with AML/CFT regulations.
110
 A further MOU between the 
CFTC and MACRA was signed in 2013.
111
 This MOU establishes a 
framework for technical cooperation and interaction between the two 
organisations in the enforcement of anti-competitive behaviour, unfair 
trading practices, mergers and acquisitions, and market studies in the 
telecommunications sector.
112
 
At the time of writing, regulators in Malawi were exploring additional 
opportunities to coordinate efforts on mobile money. For instance, the 
CFTC was also planning to enter into an MOU with RBM by June 2014 to 
provide a framework for cooperating and enforcing consumer welfare 
issues in the financial sector.
113
 Further, the CFTC plans to engage with 
the Ministry of Information and Civic Education to better understand this 
Ministry’s plan to enact draft legislation to deal with mobile and cyber 
issues.
114
  
F. Strategic Development for Mobile Money 
A number of strategic policy documents are used by RBM and the 
MOF to outline the roadmap for both payments system development and 
financial inclusion which directly affect the development of the mobile 
money sector in Malawi. These documents are useful to clarify for all 
stakeholders the policy objectives of regulators and proposed strategic 
developments for the financial system in Malawi.  
 
 
 107. For example, as outlined below, the MOF produced the Financial Inclusion Strategy for 
2010-2014, which focused on extending financial services; RBM has encouraged the development of 
mobile money to give effect to MOF’s vision expressed in its Financial Inclusion Strategy for 2010–
2014 document. Id.  
 108. Id. at 17.  
 109. Id.  
 110. As discussed below in Part IV.B, Malawi’s mobile money-related AML/CFT regulations 
include the E-Money Regulations, the Money Laundering Proceeds of Serious Crime and Terrorist 
Financing Act 2006 (AML/CFT Act), the Money Laundering, Proceeds of Serious Crime and Terrorist 
Financing Regulations 2011, and Customer Due Diligence for Banks and Financial Institutions, 
Directive 2005.  
 111. Id.  
 112. Kalasawa, supra note 57. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. at 18. 
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These documents include: 
 The Malawi National Payment System Vision and Strategy 
Framework for the Period 2009 to 2013 (Payment System 
Vision for 2009–2013);115 
 The draft Malawi National Payment Systems Vision and 
Strategy Framework for the Period 2014 to 2018 (Payment 
System Vision for 2014–2018);116 
 The Malawi National Strategy for Financial Inclusion 2010–
2014 (Financial Inclusion Strategy for 2010–2014);117 and 
 The RBM’s draft July 2013 to December 2016 Planned Strategy 
(RBM Strategy for 2013–2016).118  
The focus of these documents is largely on developing strategies and 
policies to support the move from cash-based payments to an increased 
use of electronic payment channels with the objective of providing the 
unbanked and under-banked with increased access to formal financial 
services.
119
 Underscoring the Malawi Government’s commitment to move 
from cash-based payments to electronic channels was the announcement 
by the MOF on 1 July 2013 that it was joining the Better Than Cash 
 
 
 115. The Payment System Vision for 2009–2013 contains plans endorsed by RBM, NPC, and the 
Bankers Association of Malawi (BAM). Malawi National Payment System Vision and Strategy 
Framework for the Period 2009–2013, RBM 3 (Dec. 2008), http://www.rbm.mw/documents/ 
payment_systems/NPS%20Vision%20%20Strategy%20Framework%20December%202008%20Final.
pdf. The Payment System Vision for 2009–2013 advocates for developing electronic payment channels 
to serve the banked and unbanked through expanding point-of-sale and ATM networks and greater 
interoperability amongst financial institutions. Id. 
 116. Id. The Payment System Vision for 2014–2018 advocates for extending financial services to 
the unbanked, including by promoting interoperability between mobile payment providers, promoting 
financial inclusion through affordable banking solutions, and by broadening the availability of 
payment products and services and adopting new technologies: Id. at 6, 8, 12, 13. 
 117. The Financial Inclusion Strategy for 2010–2014, issued by the MOF, emphasises the need to 
expand services beyond the formal banking sector: The Malawi National Strategy for Financial 
Inclusion (2010–2014), GOVERNMENT OF MALAWI MINISTRY OF FINANCE 8–9 (Jan. 2010), 
http://www.finance.gov.mw/fspu/index.php/financial-sector-laws/strategy-documents/49-2010-2014-
national-strategy-for-financial-inclusion/file. This document highlights the need to reduce the costs of 
a cash economy but to also provide greater access to electronic channels (including mobile phones) in 
terms of a broader focus on payments system development. The Financial Inclusion Strategy 2010–
2014 also emphasises that incentives should be offered to financial providers involved in piloting new 
access-friendly innovations. Id. 
 118. This document focuses on encouraging people to take up new payment avenues, which will 
include mobile money through, for example, public awareness campaigns and market-based research: 
Strategic Plan 2013–2016, GOVERNMENT OF MALAWI MINISTRY OF FINANCE 33, 57, http://www. 
finance.gov.mw/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=188&Itemid=55. 
 119. Id. 
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Alliance (BTCA).
120
 Malawi is also working towards enacting a national 
switch which will provide a switching platform for internet banking, 
remittances, and mobile money transactions.
121
 This switch will enable 
mobile money customers to make payments across mobile money schemes 
and to depositors of Malawi’s 11 commercial banks. All banks and MNOs 
will be able to join the switch with the intention that retail payments 
systems will eventually move towards being interoperable.
122
  
G. Main Regulatory Framework for Mobile Money 
At the time of our country study, the Mobile Guidelines were the 
dominant regulator of mobile money in Malawi.
123 
The Mobile Guidelines 
specify that MNOs are able to provide mobile money in Malawi and they 
set out the requirements that MNOs are expected to adhere to in doing 
so.
124
 Legislative and regulatory changes are being proposed in Malawi to 
further develop the mobile money market and to broaden financial 
inclusion. The proposed legislation is the Payments Systems Bill 2013 
(Payments Bill) and the proposed regulations are the draft Reserve Bank 
(E-Money) Regulations, 2014 (E-Money Regulations).
125
 
The Payments Bill will provide greater clarity on RBM’s oversight 
arrangements for mobile money and also for Malawi’s payments systems 
and payments system providers more broadly, thereby bringing Malawi 
into line with international best practice in this area.
126
 The draft E-Money 
Regulations set out regulatory arrangements for e-money including the 
approval and licensing of entities and their agents, issuing and storing the 
 
 
 120. See Malawi Joins Better Than Cash Alliance, BETTER THAN CASH ALLIANCE (June 27, 
2013), http://betterthancash.org/news-releases/malawi-announces-commitment-to-transition-to-electronic-
payments. The Better Than Cash Alliance raises awareness about the benefits of replacing physical 
cash with electronic payments, accelerating this replacement process through the following means: 
advocacy; providing financial, technical and financial assistance to those aiming to shift towards 
electronic payments; and developing research on this topic. About Better Than Cash Alliance, BETTER 
THAN CASH ALLIANCE, http://betterthancash.org/about (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
 121. Chikondi Chiyemekeza, Malawi National Switch Centre Live in 2014, THE NATION (Sept. 2, 
2013), http://mwnation.com/malawi-national-switch-centre-live-2014. 
 122. Id. at 19. 
 123. Note that the Mobile Guidelines are not hard law per se: laws/regulations must be issued by 
the Minister of Finance as per RBM Act, § 56 (Malawi), available at http://www.uncdf.org/sites/ 
default/files/Documents/the_regulation_of_mobile_money_in_malawi_project_report_final_version. 
pdf. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Payments Systems Bill 2013 (Malawi) [hereinafter Payment Systems Bill 2013]; Reserve 
Bank (E-Money) Regulations 2014 (Malawi) [hereinafter E-Money Regulations].  
 126. Id. The Payments Bill was widely circulated amongst the policy, regulatory, and donor 
community in Malawi, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. 
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underlying funds which e-money represents, and operating the payment 
systems involved in the transfer of the e-money.
127
 The regulations do not 
specify the type of institution which can provide mobile money, but 
instead take an activity-focused approach: any entity providing e-money is 
captured by the regulations.
128
 In this way, the E-Money Regulations will 
cover all entities providing mobile money, including banks and non-
banks.
129
 The E-Money Regulations will replace the existing Mobile 
Guidelines.
130
 At the time of writing (March 2014), it was expected that 
the E-Money Regulations would be under consideration by the MOF and 
then mandated and gazetted by the Minister of Finance, pursuant to the 
RBM Act. 
H. Additional Regulations Pertaining to Mobile Money 
Mobile money activities in Malawi are also governed by the following 
additional regulations:  
 The Money Laundering Proceeds of Serious Crime and 
Terrorist Financing Act 2006 (AML/CFT Act) and the Money 
Laundering, Proceeds of Serious Crime and Terrorist Financing 
Regulations 2011 (AML/CFT Regulations)mobile money 
providers are defined as financial institutions (i.e. money 
transmission services) under the AML/CFT Act.
131
 
 The Communications Act 1998 (Communications Act)an 
MNO must be licensed by MACRA under this legislation in 
order to undertake the activity of providing mobile money.
132
  
 
 
 127. Id. The E-Money Regulations were drafted by RBM-Payments Department with input from a 
consultant provided through the World Bank’s Financial Sector Assistance Program. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. § 19(1). ‘E-money service provider’ is defined in E-Money Regulations, § 2 to mean ‘a 
legal entity that accepts banknotes, coins or other means of payment in exchange for e-money, and 
facilitates the transfer of this e-money to make payments and transfers.’ This means a bank or non-
bank can be an e-money issuer and so is obliged to confirm with agent rules in the regulations. 
 130. Id. § 40. 
 131. See AML/CFT Act, § 2 (Malawi), available at https://www.rbm.mw/documents/pisu/ 
Money%20Laundering%20Act%202006.pdf (containing definition of Financial Institution). 
 132. Id. at 20. 
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 The Competition and Fair Trading Act 2000 (Competition Act) 
applies to commercial activity in Malawi, potentially also 
including MNO-bank/MFI partnerships.
133
  
 The Banking Act 1989 (Banking Act)banks are required to 
obtain approval from RBM before engaging in MNO-bank/MFI 
partnerships.
134
  
 The Consumer Protection Act 2003MACRA administers this 
legislation. It includes provisions outlining customers’ redress 
mechanisms and specifies that contracts governing financial 
transactions shall be interpreted, implemented, and enforced: 
‘(a) in good faith, (b) consistent with the instrument embodying 
the contract between the parties, and (c) in a manner consistent 
with the laws governing or regulating financial transactions.’135 
As Malawi further develops its legislative and regulatory 
framework for mobile money, it is expected that this legislation 
will be applied more directly to the mobile money sector.
136
  
This Article will now examine the practical challenges that Malawi has 
faced in using an enabling approach and implementing proportionate 
regulation. For each issue it will examine the following: ‘best practice,’ 
defined as broad themes in the research on the topic in question; ‘in 
practice,’ defined as Malawi’s existing approach; ‘analysis,’ which sets 
out views and recommendations on how Malawi could further strengthen 
its efforts in the mobile money sector in line with international best 
practice; and conclusions on how Malawi’s experience can be drawn on to 
better identify the practical challenges of implementing an enabling 
approach and/or proportionate regulation in the mobile money sector.   
 
 
 133. Id.  
 134. Id.  
 135. See Consumer Protection Act 2003: § 28(2) (Malawi), available at https://www.rbm.mw/ 
documents/pisu/Consumer%20Protection%20Act.pdf. See also FinMark Report, supra note 39, at 18. 
 136. Id.  
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III. ENABLING APPROACH 
A. Coordination among Regulators and between Regulators and Industry 
1. Best Practice 
As mobile money involves a range of market players, it engages a 
number of regulators with different regulatory responsibilities. 
Cooperative efforts among regulators are therefore essential to ensure 
consistent and coordinated policy approaches and the smooth 
implementation of legislative and regulatory initiatives. For these reasons 
it is important for a country to have mechanisms in place for effective 
cooperation between regulators.
137
 
Cooperation and coordination will be most effective when it draws 
upon the relative strengths of different regulatory agencies. Local context 
will determine which regulator takes the lead role and which 
responsibilities other regulators assume; an assessment of the capacity of 
various regulatory agencies to fulfill their designated roles should 
therefore be conducted. Training and education should be arranged where 
necessary to develop expertise and expand capacity. Specific regulatory 
approaches will also have implications for how cooperation between 
regulators proceeds. For example, if the regulatory framework is based on 
an entity-focused approach, there may be a tendency for regulators to 
operate on a silo-type basis which reflects their own areas of expertise, 
rather than taking a holistic, risk-based approach to developing regulation. 
This can potentially lead to an unequal playing field for the different entity 
types being regulated, creating problems such as disproportionate 
regulation or regulatory arbitrage. In contrast, an activity-focused, risk-
based regulatory approach will encourage cooperation between regulators 
to develop a level playing field for the different entities involved in the 
same activity of providing mobile money products and services. 
 
 
 137. Further details on international Best Practice on cooperative oversight arrangements can be 
found in the Central Bank Oversight of Payment and Settlement Systems, BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS (May 2005), https://www.bis.org/publ/cpss68.htm. For a discussion on the dangers that 
regulators will not sufficiently co-ordinate between themselves, see Supervising Nonbank E-money 
Issuers, CONSULTATIVE GRP. TO ASSIST THE POOR 2 (July 2012), https://www.cgap.org/sites/ 
default/files/CGAP-Brief-Supervising-Nonbank-Emoney-Issuers-Jul-2012.pdf; Mobile Money for 
Business Development in the East African Community, supra note 16, at 28. Regulators need to make 
sure they leverage their unique competencies and capabilities in a coordinated approach to regulation 
and oversight of branchless banking services: see GSR 2011 Discussion Paper: The Regulatory 
Landscape for Mobile Banking, INT’L TELECOMM UNION 13 (2011), http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/treg/Events/Seminars/GSR/GSR11/documents/04-M-Banking-E.pdf. 
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A regulatory framework developed through consultation with industry 
offers scope to be more responsive to new market players and 
technological innovations. Regulators adopting this approach may find it 
easier to assess the potential impact of proposed regulatory changes 
through engagement with industry stakeholders. Regulators who actively 
engage new players in the policy development process will also be able to 
keep pace more readily with developments in this innovative sector of the 
payments system. This engagement will be beneficial for regulators, 
market players, and the end-users as industry players can highlight risks 
for the regulators and identify how they will mitigate them; regulators may 
also be better prepared to respond to consumer confidence issues or 
concerns on system stability risks. 
2. In Practice 
In Malawi, regulators from a range of areas such as banking, payments, 
telecommunications, as well as competition and consumer protection are 
involved in coordinating the oversight approach for mobile money. 
Industry players are also actively involved in contributing to the strategic 
direction of the mobile money market. These coordinated efforts support 
Malawi in moving towards an enabling legal and regulatory environment 
for mobile money. 
As has been discussed above, RBM is the lead regulator for the sector 
while the MOF is involved in strategic policy development as part of its 
broader role in improving financial inclusion.
138
 RBM leads coordination 
efforts through industry bodies such as the NPC and the MMCG, and 
through an internal cross-departmental task force, the E-Banking Task 
Force.
139
 There is also considerable cooperation occurring between 
regulators and government bodies using informal and formal mechanisms 
such as MOUs.
140
 For example, RBM has encouraged the development of 
mobile money in order to give effect to MOF’s vision of extending 
financial services to the unbanked expressed in its Financial Inclusion 
Strategy for 2010–2014.141 At the time of writing, regulators in Malawi 
were exploring additional opportunities to coordinate efforts on mobile 
 
 
 138. Id. at 23.  
 139. The composition and focus of the coordinating bodies are detailed in Part II of this Article. 
 140. Details on MOUs are outlined in Part II of this Article. 
 141. See Ministry of Finance: Financial Sector Development Unit: Economic Affairs Division, 
The Malawi National Strategy for Financial Inclusion 2010–2014 (Jan. 2010), http://www.finance. 
gov.mw/fspu/index.php/financial-sector-laws/strategy-documents/49-2010-2014-national-strategy-for-
financial-inclusion/file.  
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money.
142
 The MMCG provides an example of a forum which coordinates 
activities of donor partners, regulators, and industry in order to promote 
the expansion of mobile money.
143
  
Malawian regulators also make use of a number of strategic policy 
documents which outline roadmaps for payments system development and 
financial inclusion, which are directly relevant to the development of the 
mobile money sector in Malawi.
144
 The focus of these documents is 
largely on developing strategies and policies to support the move from 
cash-based payments to an increased use of electronic payment channels, 
with the objective of providing the unbanked and under-banked increased 
access to formal financial services.
145
 This objective was further 
underscored by the Malawi Government’s membership of the BTCA 
which was announced on 1 July 2013.
146
  
3. Analysis 
RBM’s oversight framework for mobile money, as detailed in the 
proposed E-Money Regulations, uses an activity-focused, risk-based 
approach which will encourage the various regulators with responsibility 
for the mobile money sector (e.g. RBM, CFTC, MACRA, FIU) to work 
together on strategic and policy development in the sector.
147
  
RBM’s existing intra-departmental coordination on mobile money 
issues, and electronic banking more generally, should contribute positively 
to equipping regulators involved in the supervision and oversight of 
 
 
 142. Details on these plans are outlined in Part II of this Article. 
 143. Press reports indicate MMCG members are drawn from the World Bank, Reserve Bank of 
Malawi, Bankers Association of Malawi, Malawi Microfinance Network, Malawi Communications 
Regulatory Authority (MACRA), mobile network operators, Ministry of Finance, which if the case, 
would appear to form the baseful of a very useful collaborative effort for mobile money in Malawi 
given the range of expertise being brought to the table. See Gregory Gondwe, Malawi to Launch Study 
on Mobile Money, BIZTECH AFRICA (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.biztechafrica.com/article/malawi-
launch-study-mobile-money/7609/?section=government#.U_p7eLySyzs. 
 144. See Reserve Bank of Malawi, Malawi National Payment System Vision and Strategy for the 
Period 2014 to 2018 (Dec. 2013); Reserve Bank of Malawi, July 2013 to December 2016 Planned 
Strategy. 
 145. Reserve Bank of Malawi, supra note 144, at 1, 7.  
 146. See Malawi Joins Better Than Cash Alliance, supra note 120. 
 147. For further discussion on issues arising from ineffective cooperation see Loretta Michaels, 
Can Mobile Money Support Post-Conflict Development? CONSULTATIVE GRP. TO ASSIST THE POOR 
(Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.cgap.org/blog/can-mobile-money-support-post-conflict-development; 
Pierre-Laurent Chatain et al., Protecting Mobile Money Against Financial Crimes: Global Policy 
Challenges and Solutions, THE WORLD BANK 119 (2011), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/ 
default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/03/10/000333037_20110310000727/Rendered/PDF/6006
00PUB0ID181Mobile09780821386699.pdf. 
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mobile money with the technical knowledge that they need to discharge 
these functions effectively. In particular, the supervision and regulation of 
mobile money requires expertise from both payments systems oversight 
and banking supervision functions because mobile money products sit 
between deposit taking activities and payments system transfer services.
148
 
Consequently, coordination mechanisms between these two functions 
within the RBM are essential to building and maintaining regulatory 
capacity for mobile money. The E-Banking Task Force should therefore 
further the achievement of this objective. Existing approaches to inter-
regulatory cooperation will also contribute positively to capacity 
development. In order to further strengthen the capacity of RBM as lead 
regulator, this co-operation should be encouraged.  
Assistance from development partners should include training on the 
oversight and supervision of mobile money. Regional groups such as the 
African Mobile Phone Financial Services Policy Initiative (AMPI),
149
 and 
the UN’s Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) may be well placed to 
provide assistance and support on targeted regulatory policies.
150 
The 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has 
assisted the East African Community in preparing guidelines for electronic 
transactions, electronic signatures and authentication, data protection and 
privacy, consumer protection, and computer crime.
151
 The MM4P has also 
undertaken extensive collaboration with RBM, resulting in such efforts as 
the study from which this paper is drawn.
152
 Ongoing support from MM4P 
could further contribute to building regulatory capacity. 
With regard to the proposed draft Payments Bill and E-Money 
Regulations, training sessions with relevant stakeholders could be used to 
raise awareness and understanding of the implications of the new 
regulatory environment. For example, preliminary training sessions could 
focus on ensuing a consistent understanding of key terminology used in 
 
 
 148. See the wider discussion about whether mobile money should be regulated as a deposit. See 
Alliance for Financial Inclusion, Regulatory Approaches to Mobile Financial Services in Latin 
America, ALLIANCE FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION 5–7 (Apr. 2012), http://www.afi-global.org/sites/ 
default/files/publications/afi_lac_special_report_en_annex_low_res.pdf.  
 149. Id. This suggestion of leveraging on the expertise of groups represented by AMPI was 
suggested at the recent meeting of AMPI, held in March 2014. 
 150. This suggestion of the ECA being well placed to help Malawi with regulatory policies was 
taken from Edwin Saidi, Towards a Faultless Mobile Commerce Implementation in Malawi, 15 J 
INTERNET BANK & COMM 9 (2010), where it was also suggested the ECA could assist with security 
and data protection issues. 
 151. Mobile Money for Business Development in the East African Community: A Comparative 
Study of Existing Platforms and Regulations, supra note 16, at 33.  
 152. Malawi Report, supra note 36. 
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the new regulatory framework. Further training sessions could then focus 
on how to implement the E-Money Regulations and ensure ongoing 
compliance. 
As noted above, industry players are actively involved in contributing 
to the strategic direction of the mobile money market in Malawi through 
industry bodies such as the NPC and the MMCG. Although there are clear 
benefits to this, regulatory bodies need to ensure that industry players are 
not relied on to guide policy development; rather, industry dialogue should 
centre on feedback and discussion on policy development in order to avoid 
potential conflicts of interest and regulatory capture.
153
 Regulators 
therefore need to distinguish between their role in promoting payments 
system development and in their regulation, and ensure that mechanisms 
are in place to address any potential conflict of interest in this area. 
B. Regulatory Mandates 
1. Best Practice 
One of the best means for promoting cooperation between agencies is 
the establishment of strong regulatory mandates that are clear, consistent, 
and transparent. The responsibilities of different agencies should be 
discrete and clearly delineated, with well-defined roles for leadership and 
coordination. Terminology should remain consistent across different 
documents and regulatory instruments, and underlying concepts should be 
defined in a way that is technology-neutral in order to ensure mandates are 
general enough to accommodate future innovation. Roadmaps for future 
regulatory activity should be developed and shared between agencies to 
ensure that new developments can be accommodated within existing 
frameworks. 
2. In Practice 
As has been outlined above, there are a range of regulators, 
government departments, and coordinating groups involved in mobile 
money policy and regulation in Malawi including: RBM, FIU, MOF, 
 
 
 153. Saidi, supra note 150, at 6, noted the potential conflict of interest for RBM if it is regulating 
entities which are guiding its policy development process. This issue can be addressed through 
focusing on developing regulatory capacity on an ongoing basis, which is particularly important when 
regulatory financial services are undergoing rapid developments such as mobile money products and 
services. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss3/7
  
 
 
 
 
2015] THE REGULATION OF MOBILE MONEY IN MALAWI 465 
 
 
 
 
NPC, CFTC, and MMCG.
154
 The RBM takes the lead role in the 
supervision and regulation of mobile money, primarily through its 
administration of the Mobile Guidelines and its role in coordinating groups 
such as the E-Banking Task Force, the MMCG, and the NPC.
155
 The RBM 
has assumed this role based on its broader mandate to regulate payments 
and promote the national payments system under the RBM Act. Two 
provisions of the RBM Act have been specifically used in relation to 
RBM’s oversight of the mobile money sector: section 4(e) states that RBM 
shall be responsible for promoting a sound financial structure in Malawi, 
including payments systems, clearing systems, and adequate financial 
services;
156
 and section 56 states that the Minister of Finance may, after 
consultation with RBM, make regulations necessary for carrying out the 
objectives and purposes of the RBM Act, to give force or effect to its 
provisions or for its better administration.
157
 The E-Money Regulations 
will initially be mandated and gazetted by the Minister of Finance, 
pursuant to this section of the RBM Act. 
The RBM, in collaboration with the NPC, has also outlined a clear 
roadmap for payments system development in the draft document Payment 
System Vision for 2014–2018.158 In it, the RBM’s existing mandate is 
made clear from the outset. Section 1 states: 
The RBM is mandated to promote and oversee the national payment 
system in the country. The mandate is entrenched in the RBM Act 
(1989) which empowers the RBM to promote a sound financial 
infrastructure in Malawi, including payment systems, clearing 
systems and adequate financial services. Based on this mandate, the 
RBM plays a leading role in transforming the country’s NPS.159 
RBM proposes to provide a follow-up report on the strategies outlined 
in the Payment System Vision for 2014–2018 using RBM’s Annual 
Payment Systems Report.
160
 The Payment System Vision for 2014–2018 
provides greater clarity, certainty, and transparency on the oversight 
framework for RBM for mobile money and payments systems more 
 
 
 154. Malawi Report, supra note 36, at 14–18. 
 155. Id. at 26. 
 156. The RBM has also used § 4(e) when issuing the Mobile Guidelines and for other payment 
initiatives, such as those outlined in the Payment System Vision for 2009–2013 and the Payment 
System Vision for 2014–2018. 
 157. Id. § 56.  
 158. Reserve Bank of Malawi, supra note 144, at 11–14. 
 159. Payment System Vision for 2014–2018, supra note 116, at 4. 
 160. Id. at 11. 
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broadly. It is also noteworthy that the vision and strategy is considered to 
be a shared responsibility of all stakeholders, and that consultation with 
stakeholders will occur through the NPC.
161
 
Plans are underway to clarify and strengthen RBM’s mandate for 
conducting the oversight of the mobile money sector and payments 
systems more broadly using payments system legislation and the E-Money 
Regulations.
162
 Payments system legislation provides transparency with 
respect to the oversight role of a central bank for payments systems and 
payments system providers, including new payments players such as 
mobile money providers, and can be designed to assist the central bank in 
meeting broader oversight objectives such as ensuring financial system 
stability. Payments system legislation is also a means of providing a level 
playing field for providers of payments services, as the legislation can be 
designed to be activity-focused rather than entity-focused. The enactment 
of payments system legislation for these reasons is now accepted as 
international best practice and supportive of promoting financial 
inclusion.
163
 
3. Analysis  
The Payment System Vision for 2014–2018 could be expanded to 
provide more detail on the proposed Payments Bill and the E-Money 
Regulations, both of which are in their final drafting stage.
164
 In particular, 
the Payment System Vision for 2014–2018 refers to the Mobile Guidelines 
 
 
 161. Reserve Bank of Malawi, supra note 144, at 15. 
 162. Malawi Report, supra note 36, at 27. 
 163. Mireya Almazan, Mobile Money for the Unbanked, GSMA (Dec. 19, 2013), 
http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/mobile-money-regulation-in-latin-america-leveling-the-
playingfield-in-brazil-peru. A GSMA article published in December 2013 on the regulatory 
development for mobile money in Brazil and Peru provides a very good overview of the reasons for 
such developments and the benefits of leveling the playing field for non-banks through regulation. 
Kenya also provides a good example of legislative and regulatory developments for mobile money. 
The enactment of its National Payments System Act (No 39 of 2011) and the draft regulations which 
will soon follow (these are now being finalised, following the closing of the consultation period in 
October 2013) will, among other things, provide greater clarity and certainty on the regulatory 
arrangements for non-bank payments providers. See National Payment Systems Draft Regulations—
Invitation for Comment, CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA, https://www.centralbank.go.ke/index.php/news/ 
323-nps-draft-regulations (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). 
 164. Payment System Vision for 2014–2018, supra note 116, at 6. The Payment System Vision for 
2014–2018 notes: “A draft Payment Systems Bill was finalised and submitted to the Ministry of 
Justice through Ministry of Finance which is expected to be enacted in 2014.” This detail could be 
expanded on to include more detail on the intention and planned implementation process of the 
legislation and regulations. 
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as relevant to regulating and guiding the mobile payments market.
165
 
However, it is planned that these guidelines will be superseded by the E-
Money Regulations.
166
 This development could be reflected in the 
Payment System Vision for 2014–2018. 
Further, a draft version of the Payments Bill refers to ‘mobile 
payments’, which appears to be referring to the same concept as ‘e-money’ 
as defined under the E-Money Regulations. The term ‘mobile payments’ 
can be more restrictive than the term ‘e-money’ and it is recommended 
that the terminology in the Payments Bill be made consistent with 
terminology used in the E-Money Regulations. This would provide clarity 
in regard to what RBM is overseeing, supervising, and regulating. Mobile 
payments generally refer to the payments access methodi.e. e-money 
(which represents an underlying stored value) or deposits which can be 
accessed via a mobile phone; however, it is primarily the activity of 
issuing the e-money (or stored value) which is being regulated and 
supervised. Stored value can be accessed and transferred using payment 
methods other than mobile phones (e.g. online access via the internet or 
via prepaid cards). Technological innovations will continue through time, 
resulting in the development of new possible access channels or payment 
methods which have not yet been contemplated. In so far as legislation and 
regulations are concerned with payments access methods, legislation and 
regulations should be designed to operate independently of the type of 
technology used. This can be done by focusing on the activity itself, not on 
the specific payment access method used. 
The Payments Bill and the E-Money Regulations should therefore be 
drafted so as to capture the activity of issuing e-money, where that e-
money represents an underlying stored value.
167
 The Payments Bill may be 
an appropriate place to include such provisions regarding the issuance of 
stored value because this stored value is accessed using payment 
instruments and payment systems.
168
 It is common practice to issue more 
 
 
 165. Reserve Bank of Malawi, supra note 144, at 6. 
 166. Malawi Report, supra note 36, at 28. 
 167. Examples of jurisdictions which take this approach include: Kenya, Philippines and 
Singapore, see The National Payment System Regulations 2014 (Kenya); Circular No. 649 2009 
(Philippines); Payment Systems (Oversight) Act 2006 (Singapore). The FinMark Report noted this 
issue as being important to clarify how institutions should treat funds held in trust which represent the 
stored value and not classified as deposits: FinMark Report, supra note 39, at 23. 
 168. See id. The FinMark Report has previously canvassed issues relating to the clarification and 
definition of the term ‘stored value’ and provided a good explanation as to how e-money comprises the 
electronic funds representing the underlying stored value.  
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detailed regulations with respect to stored value pursuant to the payments 
law.
169
  
Moreover, it is the authors’ understanding that the intention is to pass 
the E-Money Regulations pursuant to the Payments Bill once it is enacted. 
We support this approach. However, we also understand that as an interim 
measure, the E-Money Regulations will be mandated pursuant to section 
56 of the RBM Act because the E-Money Regulations may be ready for 
implementation prior to the Payments Bill being passed by Parliament. 
Should this be the case, consideration could be given to explaining these 
interim arrangements to all stakeholders by, for instance, providing details 
of these plans in the Payment System Vision for 2014–2018. This approach 
would clarify the path ahead for oversight arrangements for mobile money 
and stored value more broadly, and in particular would make it clear that 
RBM’s regulatory mandate extends to include the oversight of mobile 
money. 
Strong regulatory mandates will help to ensure the clear and 
coordinated development of mobile money regulation. Malawi’s E-Money 
Regulations and Payments Bill are an important step in the furtherance of 
this aim. However, the draft provisions appear to contain inconsistent uses 
of certain important terms such as ‘mobile money’ and ‘e-money.’ This 
potentially creates a lack of clarity regarding RBM’s mandate over mobile 
money. The Alliance for Financial Inclusion’s (AFI) document, titled 
Mobile Financial Services: Basic Terminology (2013), may be useful to 
reduce inconsistencies in terminology.
170
  
C. Understanding and Building Consumer Demand for Mobile Money 
1. Best Practice 
While mobile money has been very successful in many countries, 
particularly Kenya and the Philippines, mobile money roll-outs in other 
developing countries have been characterised by low uptake and inactive 
users.
171
 This situation may have occurred due to a focus on broadening 
 
 
 169. Malawi Report, supra note 36, at 29. 
 170. Mobile Financial Services Working Group, supra note 1. 
 171. Claire Pénicaud, State of the Industry: Results from the 2012 Global Mobile Money Adoption 
Survey, GSMA 1, http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/MMU_ 
State_of_industry.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). For example, see discussion in of GSMA’s 2012 
global mobile money adoption survey in which just 6 out of 150 current mobile money deployments 
have reached more than 1 million active customers. Id. Of the remaining 90 percent of MNOs, only 
around 0.9 percent on average of the customer base was actively using mobile money 12 months after 
the launch. Id. at 13. This suggests that understanding consumer demand is also a pressing issue at the 
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accessibility (i.e. through developing agent networks and mass sign-ups of 
end-users) rather than understanding the needs of end-users. As a 
consequence, development partners are now encouraging a greater focus 
on the demand side of mobile money, i.e. understanding the needs of end-
users.
172
 To develop successful mobile money ecosystems, and digital 
financial services (DFS)
173
 ecosystems more broadly, it is recognised there 
is a need to go beyond ensuring these products are simply available, 
accessible, and affordable. There is a need to ensure they have an effect, 
are used, and become sustainable.
174
  
Financial regulators can work with industry players to understand and 
build consumer demand so as to better identify which market 
developments need to be encouraged or facilitated through policy and 
regulatory changes. Problems have arisen when payment providers assume 
that the building of a network will in and of itself lead to sufficient 
consumer demand for mobile money, and regulators respond only to the 
immediate problem of how to regulate new types of entities rolling out 
new payments products and services.
175
 By focusing on the need to 
understand and promote consumer demand, regulators will assist in 
avoiding those problems.  
Regulators can assess a mobile money product’s potential for 
promoting financial inclusion by considering how well the initiative 
 
 
level of providers. See Mireya Almazan, G2P Payments & Mobile Money: Opportunity or Red 
Herring?, GSMA (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/g2p-payments-
mobile-money-opportunity-or-red-herring. 
 172. Louise Malady and Ross Buckley, Building Consumer Demand for Digital Financial 
Services: The New Regulatory Frontier 8 (Aug. 2014), http://www.clmr.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/ 
files/attached_files/building_consumer_demand_for_digital_financial_services.pdf. 
 173. A note on terminology in this section: Digital Financial Services (DFS) or Mobile Financial 
Services (MFS) are terms which are being increasingly used in place of more specific terms such as 
mobile money. In this section, DFS is used to refer to a range of financial services accessible via 
digital remote access as opposed to traditional financial services accessed through physically visited a 
bank branch. Mobile money is included in the definition of DFS. 
 174. See Alexandre, Mas & Radcliffe, supra note 6, at 116–34 for a discussion of regulatory steps 
needed to ensure market players can experiment with new products, which will be needed to ensure 
these products actually meet the demands of the unbanked. Davis and Owens contrast different 
countries to illustrate the importance of local context in understanding demand. John Owens & Ben 
Davis, POS vs. Mobile Phone as a Channel for M-Banking, MICROSAVE (Sept. 19, 2008), 
http://www.rbapmabs.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/BN-66-POS-vs-Mobile-Phone.pdf. 
 175. Graham Wright (head of Microsave) recently commented on this point in his reflections on 
the Mor Committee report—Wright notes the report offers a “sophisticated vision of the financial 
architecture” and a road map for providing financial access to all, however he questioned whether due 
consideration was given to the demand side noting that “the report seems to imply that low income 
people’s demand for formal financial services was a given.” See Graham Wright, The Mor Committee 
Report—the Demand Side Conundrum, MICROSAVE (Feb. 2014), http://blog.microsave.net/the-mor-
committee-report-the-demand-side-conundrum. 
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focuses on local context and the customer value proposition. Emphasising 
these two aspects in mobile money initiatives will ensure players and 
products are being encouraged which deliver mobile money solutions that 
are useful and relevant for the under-banked and unbanked.
176
  
Customer demand surveys are a useful means of assessing specific 
customer requirements but care should be taken in interpreting the results 
of the demand studies. For example, survey results depend heavily on the 
precise questions asked, and may only offer a single point in time picture 
rather than an understanding of the longer run perspective. Customer 
perceptions are also important, such as perceptions of their existing access 
to financial services (formal and informal) and what they may consider 
valuable in a new service or product.
177
  
Regulators can encourage the development of successful and 
sustainable DFS ecosystems by encouraging and participating in efforts to 
build consumer demand. Such efforts include being an enabling 
regulator,
178
 encouraging cash payments to be done electronically using 
mobile money or DFS, particularly government payments (such as G2P 
and person-to government (P2G)),
179
 and facilitating financial literacy 
efforts which focus on incorporating end-users needs.
180
 Developing 
open/interoperable/interconnected systems and acknowledging the 
importance of partnerships by allowing or enabling traditional and non-
traditional players to partner will also assist in building consumer demand. 
Note that interoperability generally means that transfers of funds from one 
mobile account can be made to the mobile account of another service 
provider; however, as will be explained below in Part III.C, 
interoperability can also occur at the level of agents and SIM/handset.
 181
 
 
 
 176. See Manoj Sharma, DFS for the Under-Banked: Research, Design and Delivery (October 
2013), available at http://www.microsave.net/files/pdf/MicroSave_DFS_for_the_Under_Banked.pdf. 
 177. Debbie Watkins, Context and Culture: Designing Relevant Financial Services, 
CONSULTATIVE GRP. TO ASSIST THE POOR (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.cgap.org/blog/context-and-
culture-designing-relevant-financial-services. 
 178. For a brief description of an enabling regulatory environment for mobile money, see 
Gutierrez & Singh, supra note 29.  
 179. Homepage, BETTER THAN CASH ALLIANCE (2014), available at http://betterthancash.org. 
 180. See Ignacio Mas, Digitizing the Kaleidoscope of Informal Financial Practices (Dec. 2013), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2359942; see also Tilman Ehrbeck, Avoid Blaming 
the Victim in the Financial Literacy Debate, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 19, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tilman-ehrbeck/the-financial-literacy-debate_b_4459311.html. 
 181. See Michael Tarazi & Kabir Kumar, Platform-level Interconnection in Branchless Banking, 
CONSULTATIVE GRP. TO ASSIST THE POOR (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.cgap.org/blog/platform-level-
interconnection-branchless-banking. Interoperability issues are currently under consideration by many 
regulators in emerging markets. The Philippines, for example, are currently focused on determining 
the best path towards interoperability. Building Consensus Towards Enabling an Efficient and 
Inclusive National Payments System in the Philippines: A Significant Step, USAID (Apr. 24, 2013), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss3/7
  
 
 
 
 
2015] THE REGULATION OF MOBILE MONEY IN MALAWI 471 
 
 
 
 
2. In Practice 
There have been various initiatives in Malawi which have contributed 
to understanding the needs of end-users both in terms of local context 
issues and the customer value proposition. In terms of local context, both 
the National Strategy Document for 2014–2018 and the RBM Strategy for 
2013–2016 consider many of the local issues which are important in 
building the mobile money ecosystem in Malawi. The National Strategy 
Document recognises the importance of focusing on interoperability issues 
and improving cash distribution/handling arrangements.
182
 In terms of 
understanding the customer value proposition, user demand surveys have 
been undertaken including the USAID Action Plan which studied demand 
for mobile and branchless banking in Malawi.
183
 The FinMark Report 
notes that mobile money will directly compete with the existing domestic 
remittance service offered by the MPC product FastCash.
184
 While there 
are many paths toward greater financial inclusion, consideration of the 
impact of policy changes on the various paths will be important. Both the 
USAID Action Plan and FinMark Report were undertaken before Airtel 
and TNM began providing mobile money in Malawi.
185
 Updated consumer 
demand studies may be needed to determine how the new schemes meet 
end-user needs versus other methods of money transfer such as FastCash.  
The accessibility and reliability of basic financial services still remains 
a fundamental challenge for many Malawians. For regulators, this 
challenge will require attention alongside questions such as how well 
Malawians will use new DFS. These questions should include: can the 
instructions on the mobile phone be read? Can the phone be charged and 
so be a reliable access point? And do most adults have the means to own a 
phone?  
 
 
http://www.simmphil.org/misc/building-consensus-towards-enabling-an-efficient-and-inclusive-national-
payments-system-in-the-philippines-a-significant-first-step. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), which is 
the Philippines’ central bank, has preferred industry involvement and for BSP to not have to mandate 
arrangements. Id. For mobile money, BSP has highlighted concerns around efficiency, competition, 
affordability and financial inclusion as being important for interoperability. Id. BSP is now working 
with the industry to develop how this interoperability will come into effect. Id. For Africa, references 
to the pending launch of the East Africa Payments System (EAPS) are expected to have implications 
for interoperability in payment systems in this region. East Africa’s Top Economies Launch Cross-
border Payment System, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/ article/2013/12/11/us-
eastafrica-trade-idUSBRE9BA0GF20131211.  
 182. Reserve Bank of Malawi, supra note 144, at 7, 9. 
 183. See generally USAID Action Plan, supra note 39. 
 184. Id. at 14. 
 185. Malawi Report, supra note 36, at 47. 
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There are a number of regulators and government departments focused 
on improving financial inclusion in Malawi, which has resulted in several 
initiatives aimed at increasing the uptake of financial services, including 
mobile money. For example, the RBM organised the country’s first 
financial literacy week in December 2013.
186
 The aim was to help 
Malawians learn about the benefits of budgeting, savings, investing, and 
generally being aware of their rights in relation to financial products.
187
 
The RBM is considering developing the Financial Literacy Week through, 
for example, one day of financial awareness every quarter.
188
 MOF, the 
Malawi Institute of Education, and RBM have implemented a financial 
literacy syllabus into Malawi’s secondary school curriculum and there are 
plans to introduce such programs at the tertiary level.
189
  
Further, the RBM Strategy for 2013–2016 details several initiatives to 
promote the use of electronic payment systems: beginning public 
awareness campaigns on payments systems to promote financial inclusion, 
conducting market based research and moral suasion to promote the 
payment services’ affordability, and periodically assessing cost structures 
provided by payments systems operators.
190
 The RBM had also shown an 
interest in encouraging the use of electronic payments systems for G2P.
191
  
Moreover, Malawi is on a path towards encouraging and facilitating 
interoperability. For example, as outlined in Part II.F, it is building a 
national switch for retail payment systems. In a speech delivered by the 
Minister of Economic Planning and Development to the BTCA, the 
Honourable Ralph Jooma noted that the national switch “will provide a 
switching platform for internet banking, remittances, and mobile money 
transactions.”192 Mr Jooma said: “we have decided to develop this as a 
shared payment services arrangement with the Bankers Association of 
Malawi so as to facilitate inter-operability and help ensure the volumes to 
make the investment viable.”193 Interoperability is identified as a policy 
 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id.  
 188. Id.  
 189. Id.  
 190. National Payments System Department, July 2013 to December 2015 Planned Strategy, 
RESERVE BANK OF MALAWI 2. 
 191. From our discussions with RBM there was also interest in encouraging the use of electronic 
payment systems for G2P, as discussed in Malawi Report, supra note 36, at 47.  
 192. Ralph Jooma, Inclusive Growth in Malawi and Digital Financial Inclusion (Sept. 24 2013), 
available at http://betterthancash.org/speech-delivered-by-hon-ralph-jooma-mp-minister-of-economic-
planning-and-development-at-partnership-for-digital-financial-inclusion-a-driver-of-inclusive-growth. 
 193. Ralph Jooma, Inclusive Growth in Malawi and Digital Financial Inclusion (Sept. 24 2013), 
available at http://betterthancash.org/speech-delivered-by-hon-ralph-jooma-mp-minister-of-economic-
planning-and-development-at-partnership-for-digital-financial-inclusion-a-driver-of-inclusive-growth. 
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objective in a number of RBM’s regulatory and policy documents.194 
While interoperability is identified as being required in the Mobile 
Guidelines this has not been enforced or pursued by RBM
195
 and at this 
stage, the two mobile money schemes in Malawi are not interoperable.
196
 
RBM’s intention is for interoperability to be considered once the mobile 
money schemes are more established.
197 
Under the proposed E-Money 
Regulations, agents will be required to operate on a ‘non-exclusive 
basis.’198  
3. Analysis 
The benefit of providing financial services to the unbanked is a strong 
incentive for regulators to continue encouraging the development of 
successful mobile money ecosystems. Efforts and plans for understanding 
and building consumer demand therefore need to be continued. Although 
the sector is still in its nascent stage, without focusing on ensuring that 
mobile money systems meet consumer needs, the mobile money 
ecosystem may not gain traction and may fail to become well-established.  
Further, the challenges presented by G2P must be more 
comprehensively understood. GSM Association’s (GSMA) Mobile Money 
Unit has written about Airtel’s experiences with G2P in Malawi (GSMA 
use the term G2P to refer to social transfers which may be funded by 
NGOs and donors in addition to government).
199
 GSMA emphasised that 
G2P may look attractive for providers and those making payments, 
however the business is challenging and “requires fully committed 
partnerships.”200 CGAP has also recently released four case studies from 
 
 
 194. See Payment System Vision for 2009–2013: § 3.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.6, 3.2.9, 4.2, Table 2, available 
at http://www.rbm.mw/documents/payment_systems/NPS%20Vision%20%20Strategy%20Framework 
%20December%202008%20Final.pdf [hereinafter Payment System Vision for 2009-2013]; Payment 
System Vision for 2014–2018, § 3.3.8 and 4.2. 
 195. Mobile Guidelines: § 5.5, 8.6, 10.1.1, 10.3.3, 11.10, and 14.11, available at https://www.rbm. 
mw/documents/payment_systems/Mobile%20Payments%20Systems%20Guidelines.pdf [hereinafter 
Mobile Guidelines]. 
 196. Malawi Report, supra note 36, at 48. 
 197. Id. From discussions with RBM, it is understood that the intention is for interoperability to be 
considered once the mobile money schemes are more established. 
 198. E-money Regulations, § 26. 
 199. Almazan, supra note 171. 
 200. Id. 
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Haiti, the Philippines, Kenya, and Uganda which examine the challenges 
in establishing mobile money based G2P payment systems.
201
 
Statistical analysis could be undertaken on transaction behaviour 
related to Government welfare payments. Several issues ought to be 
investigated, including whether social payments are fully withdrawn each 
time they are paid into recipients’ bank accounts, whether data is available 
on the cost of cash distribution for these welfare payments, and how this 
might compare to the cost of distributing the payments through a mobile 
phone banking service. The location of existing cash-out points for social 
payments could be determined and consideration ought to be given to 
whether replacing or building on these cash-out points with mobile money 
agents’ cash distributions points will lead to increased efficiencies.  
It is imperative that interoperability be comprehensively considered in 
any initiative to further mobile money development. Interoperability can 
occur at many levels, such as: the mobile money platform (when a 
customer with an account from one Provider can send or receive money to 
or from the account of a customer with a different Provider); the agent (a 
customer can withdraw or deposit money at an agent of another Provider 
(or at independent agents); and the handset/SIM level (a customer can 
access his or her account using any phone with any SIM card).
202
 The 
issue is therefore complicated by terminology and what type of 
interoperability is required. RBM could clarify what type or level of 
interoperability is to be aimed for in relation to mobile money schemes in 
Malawi. The intention of connecting mobile money systems to the national 
switch has been identified as a way of introducing interoperability. This 
initiative is in line with international developments in payments system 
infrastructure.
203
 Also under the proposed E-Money Regulations, agents 
will be prohibited from operating exclusively for any particular mobile 
money provider which will allow for interoperability at the user level.
204
  
 
 
 201. Jamie Zimmerman & Kristy Bohling, E-Payments in Low-Income Settings: Cutting-Edge or 
High Risk?, CONSULTATIVE GRP. TO ASSIST THE POOR (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.cgap.org/blog/e-
payments-low-income-settings-cutting-edge-or-high-risk. 
 202. See Interoperability and Related Issues in Branchless Banking, CONSULTATIVE GRP. TO 
ASSIST THE POOR (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.slideshare.net/CGAP/interoperability-and-related-
issues-in-branchless-banking-a-framework-december-2011. 
 203. For example, Australia is currently developing a national retail payments switch which 
should allow for payments innovations such as mobile money to connect to: Stephanie Bolt, David 
Emery & Paul Harrigan, Fast Retail Payment Systems, RESERVE BANK OF AUSTRALIA (Dec. 2014), 
http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2014/dec/pdf/bu-1214-6.pdf. The Philippines is also 
considering developing a national switch (noted from BSP discussions at the ADB-CGAP Branchless 
Banking in the Pacific Seminar, Sydney (Nov. 19, 2013). 
 204. E-Money Regulations, § 26. This regulation states that ‘Agents shall not be contracted by the 
E-Money Service Provider on an exclusive basis.’ 
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Regulators can use an understanding of consumer demand to better 
appreciate which market developments need to be encouraged or 
facilitated through policy and regulatory changes. In doing so, regulators 
can facilitate the building of sustainable mobile money ecosystems and 
move closer to the goal of providing financial access for all. There have 
been various initiatives in Malawi which have contributed towards 
understanding the needs of end-users both in terms of local context issues 
and the customer value proposition.
205
 There have also been many 
initiatives in building demand.  
These initiatives should be continued and developed in order to ensure 
that market players keep end-users’ needs at the forefront of business 
decisions. Careful assessment of the challenges to be expected in roll-outs 
of G2P programmes are recommended and data analysis may assist in this 
assessment. On interoperability as a means of building consumer demand, 
further industry discussion should occur on the level and type of 
interoperability being considered. Interoperability is a term which can 
have many meanings and it is important for both the regulators and 
industry players to be clear about what type is being discussed in order to 
set clear goals for its achievement. Understanding and building consumer 
demand for mobile money initiatives should remain at the forefront of 
those focused on improving financial inclusion as this will contribute 
towards the establishment of sustainable and successful mobile money 
markets. 
IV. PROPORTIONATE REGULATION 
The following parts relate to the substance of regulation. As outlined 
above, research advocates for a proportionate approach to designing 
substantive rules on mobile money. This section examines the following 
four areas where substantive rules are required.  
A. Regulatory Arrangements for the Use of Agents 
1. Best Practice 
Regulations governing the use of agents will become increasingly 
important in Malawi as the size of agent networks and the range of 
 
 
 205. The National Strategy Document for 2014–2018 and the RBM Strategy for 2013–2016 
consider many issues that are relevant to building Malawi’s mobile money system. A variety of user 
demand surveys have been undertaken to understand the customer value proposition for mobile and 
branchless banking in Malawi, such as the USAID Action Plan. 
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services available through mobile money platforms grow. In particular, the 
growing number of MNO-bank/MFI partnerships means that agents may 
provide a wider range of services through mobile phones. The low level of 
financial literacy in Malawi has been a key issue for MNOs when 
selecting and training agents.
206
 This, alongside other issues which are 
commonly experienced in building agent networks in emerging countries 
such as agent illiquidity and operational risk,
207
 has led to MNOs using 
considerable resources in building agent networks.
208
 This situation may 
have restricted the MNOs’ further expansion of agent networks in 
Malawi.
209
 Liquidity risk such as cash-out constraints are a common issue 
because agents need to be able to meet customer demand for the physical 
cash.
210
 Operational risks in Malawi arise as a result of agents being 
unable to perform tasks effectively due to low levels of financial literacy 
and high staff turn-over.
211
  
Regulation should address these risks and pave the way for smoother 
expansion of agent networks and service offerings. This regulation should 
ensure that providers have discretion to determine how to grow their agent 
networks. However, reports of robbery of agents in Uganda and Tanzania 
and agent theft in Malawi suggest that discretion needs to be balanced 
with regulatory oversight, particularly to protect customers from loss.
212
  
2. In Practice 
The Mobile Guidelines and proposed E-Money Regulations contain a 
variety of rules and regulations designed to reduce risks that arise from 
 
 
 206. Malawi Report, supra note 36, at 16. 
 207. See Mobile Financial Services Risk Matrix, USAID (July 23, 2010), http://www.gsma.com/ 
mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/mobilefinancialservicesriskmatrix100723.pdf; Neil 
Davidson & Paul Leishman, Introduction: Building, Incentivising and Managing a Network of Mobile 
Money Agents, GSMA (2010), http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/ 
2012/03/intro.pdf. 
 208. Id.  
 209. At the time of doing fieldwork for this study, data on the growth in the numbers of agents for 
mobile money were not available.  
 210. For a more detailed discussion on liquidity risk see Alexandre, Mas & Radcliffe, supra note 
6. This Article focuses on the mobile money transaction process to identify the functions and 
regulatory issues that arise at each step of the transaction process such as account opening procedures, 
the cash-in cash-out arrangements, the electronic messaging arrangements, the float management and 
the settlement arrangements.  
 211. Id. at 30. 
 212. Graham Wright, Why Rob Agents? Because That’s Where the Money Is, MICROSAVE (Aug. 
2013), http://blog.microsave.net/why-rob-agents-because-thats-where-the-money-is; Queen Nhlema, 
Airtel Money Agent Arrested in Mzimba, CAPITALFM (June 30, 2014), http://www.capitalradio 
malawi.com/index.php/component/k2/item/1619-airtel-money-agent-arrested-in-mzimba. 
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agent activity. The E-Money Regulations will replace the Mobile 
Guidelines and it is expected that these regulations will be mandated in 
2014.
213
 The E-Money Regulations are more comprehensive than the 
Mobile Guidelines and apply to any entity providing e-money services, 
which includes mobile money.
214
 Comments in this part on the regulatory 
arrangements governing the use of agents focus on those arrangements as 
described in the proposed E-Money Regulations.
215
 RBM, similar to other 
regulators involved in overseeing mobile money, views the use of agents 
as an outsourcing arrangement between the mobile money provider, 
referred to as an E-Money Service Provider (EMSP) in the E-Money 
Regulations, and its agents.
216
 Therefore, the E-Money Regulations focus 
on requirements and expectations of the EMSP with respect to its use of 
agents.
217
 These rules include provisions to the effect that the MNO: is 
required to use a written contract with agents, is liable for the agents’ 
actions, must conduct agent training, and must obtain certain details about 
the agent prior to signing-on the agent.
218
  
The E-Money Regulations are comprehensive in addressing the main 
risks arising from the use of agents. Provisions in the regulations focus on: 
managing agent illiquidity, operational risk, customer mistreatment, 
KYC/Customer Due Diligence (CDD) requirements, credit risk, and 
operational risk.
219
 RBM does not directly regulate agents except for the 
following activities: monitoring and enforcing KYC for agents, 
intermittently inspecting agents, and reviewing monthly information on 
agent activity which MNOs provide to the RBM Payments Department.
220
  
 
 
 213. Id. at 31. 
 214. E-money service provider’ is defined in E-Money Regulations, section 2 to mean ‘a legal 
entity that accepts banknotes, coins or other means of payment in exchange for e-money, and 
facilitates the transfer of this e-money to make payments and transfers.’ This means a bank or non-
bank can be an e-money issuer and so is obliged to confirm with agent rules in the regulations, see E-
Money Regulations, § 19(1). 
 215. The authors of this article have provided earlier comments to RBM on how this topic is dealt 
with in the E-Money Regulations. 
 216. § 2 of the E-Money Regulations defines “e-money service provider” as a legal entity that 
accepts banknotes, coins or other means of payment in exchange for e-money, and facilitates the 
transfer of this e-money to make payments and transfers.  
 217. Part VI of the E-Money Regulations deals with agents. 
 218. E-Money Regulations, § 19(1) (permitted activities of agents), § 12(11) (principal-agent 
liability), § 12(11-12), § 13, § 20(1), § 21(1), § 22(1), § 23(1), § 26 (the relationship between the 
principal and agent), § 23(d, e), § 31, § 34 (methods by which RBM can monitor agent activity), and 
§ 13 (outsourcing). 
 219. Protections in the E-Money Regulations operate as follows: agent illiquidity (§ 22(1)(c), 
23(1)(f)), operational risk (§ 23), customer mistreatment (§ 22, 23); KYC/CDD (§ 22(1)(d), 23(1)(b)), 
credit risk (§ 22(1)(f, g)), and operational risk (§ 23(1)). CDD is the same as know your customer 
(KYC). These terms are used interchangeably in this Article. 
 220. Malawi Report, supra note 36, at 31 
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3. Analysis 
The E-Money Regulations appear to define an agent as an entity 
requiring the approval of RBM.
221
 Approving individual agents may be an 
onerous task for a regulator and also for regulated entities.
222
 RBM may 
therefore need to consider streamlining the approval process. For example, 
if regulated institutions confirm in writing to RBM that all of its agents 
operate under a contractual outsourcing agreement as specified in the 
Guidelines, and this agreement has been approved by RBM, then this 
could be considered as the agency arrangement being approved by the 
Bank. Streamlining the approval process is just one example of how the 
regulatory burden on regulated entities, agents, and RBM itself could be 
minimised in order to support the growth of mobile money.  
As has been noted above, the E-Money Regulations apply to banks and 
non-banks providing mobile money, and so provide the same agency 
regulations for both types of institutions.
223
 This service-based approach is 
highly desirable as it creates a level playing field between different types 
of service providers offering mobile money.
224
 This may encourage banks 
to begin providing mobile money in Malawi, which will further help attain 
financial inclusion objectives. However, providers may require 
clarification on how the E-Money Regulations sit alongside the Financial 
Services (Agent Banking) Regulations 2012 (Agent Banking 
Regulations).
225
 The Agent Banking Regulations apply to agents carrying 
on agent banking activities and specify additional requirements given the 
increased range of activities which agent banking encompasses compared 
to e-money activities.
226
 A policy statement to accompany the E-Money 
Regulations once they are mandated could provide such clarification for 
industry. 
 
 
 221. Id.  
 222. Id.  
 223. See E-Money Regulations § 3, Part IV. Note that banks may be held to additional rules if 
conducting banking businesses through agents. E-Money Regulations, § 22.1.  
 224. For further discussion on the issue of a level playing field when it comes to legal liability for 
the actions of agents, see Michael Tarazi & Paul Breloff, Non-Bank E-Money Issuers: Regulatory 
Approaches to Protecting Customers Funds, CONSULTATIVE GRP. TO ASSIST THE POOR (July 2010), 
http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-Focus-Note-Nonbank-E-Money-Issuers-Regulatory-
Approaches-to-Protecting-Customer-Funds-Jul-2010.pdf. 
 225. Financial Services (Agent Banking) Regulations 2012 (Agent Banking Regulations), 
available at http://www.rbm.mw/documents/basu/Agent%20banking%20regulations.pdf.  
 226. Id. § 3. 
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The E-Money Regulations prohibit agents from being contracted on an 
exclusive basis.
227
 Some countries have been reluctant to regulate on this 
and are pursuing the same end through non-regulatory means or by 
requiring permission from the regulator if exclusive agreements are to be 
used.
228
 While there is merit in prohibiting exclusive agent agreements, it 
is useful to assess the pros and cons of this approach, and to discuss with 
industry players their concerns about free riders versus network 
benefits.
229
 
Good quality quantitative and qualitative background information is the 
backbone of good policy making. The E-Money Regulations include a 
number of reporting requirements, both regular reporting and event-driven 
reporting.
230
 These reports should enable RBM to compile and analyse 
statistics on the growth and use of mobile money agent networks in 
Malawi. It is recommended that plans for collating and analysing the 
information be considered alongside implementation of the E-Money 
Regulations to ensure all data needed is captured by the regulations. 
The challenges the two MNOs are facing in building their agent 
networks indicates that market players need a degree of regulatory 
flexibility when a mobile money sector is in the early stages of 
development.
231
 In Malawi, the two MNOs need to determine how to most 
effectively deal with a number of agent-related issues, particularly agent 
illiquidity and the expenses required for training and retraining. Important 
provisions of Malawi’s E-Money Regulations provide the MNOs with 
flexibility in organising their approaches to agent network management.
232
 
In particular, these provisions make the Provider liable for its agents’ 
actions rather than requiring the RBM to regulate agents directly.
233
 This 
regulatory flexibility must be balanced with effective oversight to 
minimise the risk of agent robbery and agent misconduct, particularly 
theft.   
 
 
 227. Id. § 26. This regulation states that ‘Agents shall not be contracted by the E-Money Service 
Provider on an exclusive basis.’ 
 228. Malawi Report, supra note 36, at 32. 
 229. See, e.g., Mobile Money War: RBZ Moves In, supra note 76 for an explanation of the issues 
in this article focusing on the RBZ’s directive for mobile money operators to seek RBZ’s permission 
prior to entering into exclusive agreements with agents. 
 230. E-Money Regulations, § 34, § 35. 
 231. See Mas & Radcliffe, supra note 34; Kimenyi & Ndung’u, supra note 34; and Alexandre, 
Mas & Radcliffe, supra note 34. 
 232. E-Money Regulations, Part VI. 
 233. Id. 
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B. Applying a Risk-Based Approach to Implementing AML/CFT Measures 
1. Best Practice 
It is important that mobile money providers are able to implement 
AML/CFT measures and that regulators can assess this implementation in 
a manner consistent with international standards, particularly those issued 
by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global standard-setting 
body for AML/CFT measures.
234
 The FATF can publicly identify and 
label countries that have inadequate AML/CFT controls as “high-risk” 
and/or “non-cooperative jurisdictions;235 however, it is also important that 
implementing AML/CFT measures does not become unduly burdensome 
for either the regulated entity or the end-user as this may compound 
financial exclusion. If the documentation required to open a new mobile 
money account is unnecessarily extensive the consumer may simply 
decide it is easier not to open the account and continue using informal 
financial services, such as cash payments and the hawala systems for 
transferring funds; they will continue to be ‘financially excluded.’236 A 
risk-based approach to implementing AML/CFT measures for mobile 
money is therefore designed to further financial inclusion by avoiding an 
unduly burdensome AML/CFT process which constrains service growth. 
In recent years, FATF has been working to increase international 
awareness and understanding of the risk-based approach, particularly for 
products such as mobile money.
237
 The underlying premise of this 
international agenda is that the goals of financial inclusion, integrity, and 
stability can be pursued simultaneously. The general principle behind 
FATF’s risk-based approach is that there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach 
to CDD: when higher risks are identified then enhanced CDD measures 
are required to manage and mitigate risks; when risks are lower, 
 
 
 234. See Symposium—Mobile Money in Developing Countries: Financial Inclusion and Financial 
Integrity, 8(3) WASH. J.L. TECH. ARTS 153 (2013) (for a detailed view of AML/CFT measures and 
mobile money). 
 235. Financial Action Task Force, High-risk and Non-cooperative Jurisdictions, FINANCIAL 
ACTION TASK FORCE (2014), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-riskandnon-cooperative jurisdictions/.  
 236. See Vivianne Jabbour, Mobile Money: Is This Industry's Chance to Show a More Socially 
Responsible Attitude?, 17(7) COMP. & TELECOM. L. REV. 181, 182 (2011), available at 
http://resourcelists.kent.ac.uk/items/B076130D-DA85-ED9D-F738-AD6EEB467348.html. 
 237. Financial Action Task Force, Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach: The Banking Sector, 
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE (2014), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Risk-
Based-Approach-Banking-Sector.pdf.  
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simplified CDD measures may be used, and in certain specific situations 
exemptions from CDD are possible.
238
  
In June 2013, FATF issued a guidance note entitled Guidance for a 
Risk-Based Approach: Prepaid Cards, Mobile Payments and Internet-
Based Payment Services (Guidance Note).
239
 This document seeks to 
provide regulators and institutions with a greater understanding of the risk-
based approach so as to enable them to make more informed judgments as 
to level of CDD required to mitigate money laundering/terrorist financing 
(ML/TF) risk and comply with international standards.
240
 The Guidance 
Note encourages the use of simplified CDD for new payment products and 
services (NPPS) which are specifically aimed at growing financial 
inclusion.
241
 It also provides details on how to apply the risk assessment 
and risk mitigation processes, which underpin the risk-based approach, for 
NPPS, and provides guidance for regulators on how to undertake the 
regulation and supervision of entities involved in providing NPPS.
242
  
The following section examines how FATF’s risk-based approach is 
being used to implement AML/CFT measures for mobile money in 
Malawi.
243
   
 
 
 238. Financial Action Task Force, Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach: Prepaid Cards, Mobile 
Payments and Internet-Based Payment Services (Guidance Note), FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE 
21–22 (2013), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/guidance-rba-npps.pdf.  
 239. The FATF Guidance Note reiterates a great deal of the content of the FATF Guidance on 
Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Measures and Financial Inclusion (2013) but with an 
emphasis on applying the risk-based approach RBA to NPPS: at 3–5. 
 240. Id. at 21.  
 241. Id. at 21–22. 
 242. Id. at 13–14. 
 243. See FinMark Report, supra note 39. The FinMark Report was written before the E-Money 
Regulations were drafted. Its main points on AML/CFT were: 
The AML/CFT Act did not specify a reduced KYC framework for low value transactions; nor 
did it specify whether transaction limits could be used for determining the level of KYC; 
The AML/CFT Act did not specify whether the KYC identification information could be held 
electronically;  
The CDD Directive, which focuses on KYC rules and procedures, did provide for the use of 
tiered KYC. However, the approach for applying the tiers was left to individual banks and 
financial institutions to determine; 
The description in the CDD Directive of identification requirements needed for basic KYC 
was such that it possibly precluded new customers without regular employment and so the 
CDD Directive’s potential was more additive than transformative for financial inclusion; 
It was not clear whether the AML/CFT Act superseded the CDD Directive because the latter was not 
referenced in the former.  
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2. In Practice 
Based on discussions with fieldwork interviewees, it was apparent that 
obtaining the correct identification documents was a challenge for many 
potential mobile money customers in Malawi, particularly in rural areas.  
At the time of our country study, Malawi’s main CDD obligations for 
mobile money were contained in the AML/CFT Act and AML/CFT 
Regulations.
244
 The Customer Due Diligence for Banks and Financial 
Institutions, Directive 2005 (CDD Directive) may also apply to mobile 
money, although this is not clear.
245
 Malawi’s proposed E-Money 
Regulations provide an updated approach on applying AML/CFT 
measures for mobile money. 
The AML/CFT Act provides that KYC requirements for individuals 
should include their name, address, and occupation, as well as any 
applicable official identifying documents like a National Identity Card or 
passport.
246
 These obligations can be reduced if the transaction is part of 
an existing and regular business relationship with a person who has 
already produced sufficient evidence of identification or if the transaction 
is an occasional transaction that does not exceed a certain amount.
247
  
The AML/CFT Act does not provide a reduced KYC framework for low 
value transactions and so may be considered unduly burdensome for some 
mobile money providers and customers. However, the AML/CFT 
Regulations outline that the FIU is authorised to allow the use of reduced 
KYC requirements.
248
 This provides the sort of tiered approach to KYC 
that is not available through the AML/CFT Act. Using this power, the FIU 
has informed Airtel and TNM that a letter from a local chief or voter 
registration card is sufficient for KYC requirements.
249
  
In practice both MNOs have found it challenging to implement KYC 
requirements, primarily because the lack of a national identification 
system in Malawi makes it difficult to identify clients.
250
 MNOs have 
experienced increased costs due to delays in obtaining a photocopy of 
 
 
 244. The AML/CFT Act applies to mobile money due to § 9.1.4 and 13.2 of the Mobile Guidelines.  
 245. CDD Directive, § 3, available at https://www.rbm.mw/documents/basu/customer%20due% 
20diligence%20directive.pdf. 
 246. AML/CFT Act, § 24(1), available at http://www.fiumalawi.gov.mw/AMLAct/index.html. 
 247. Id. § 24(7).  
 248. AML Regulations, § 3 (sub-regulations 5 and 7), 23, available at http://www.fiumalawi.gov. 
mw/AMLRegulations.pdf. 
 249. Malawi Report, supra note 36, at 35. 
 250. Id. 
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identification or a letter from a local chief.
251
 Obtaining information on the 
source and level of income has also been found to be relatively costly. 
3. Analysis 
There are a number of provisions in the E-Money Regulations that 
relate to KYC requirements for mobile money. These provisions are 
designed to harmonise with and not replace those obligations contained in 
the AML/CFT Act. Under the E-Money Regulations, EMSPs can use a 
tiered KYC approach,
252
 and the Regulations provide detail on how such a 
tiered approach would operate. The implementation of these regulations 
may raise the following points.  
First, Part VII, section 30 of the E-Money Regulations indicates that 
RBM will determine the applicable transaction limit for each tier of KYC. 
This approach is different to that elsewhere; for example, in the EU, where 
the EU sets the relevant amount in its Directives.
253
 How RBM will make 
its determination on applicable transaction limits could involve industry 
consultation.  
Second, it is necessary to clarify identification requirementsthe RBM 
will need to determine how a customer’s identification can be captured. 
The E-Money Regulations imply that only paper based records are 
permissible. For example, section 32.1.1.3 refers to photocopying the 
identification, and manually recording the identification if no 
photocopying facility is available.
254
 As will be further explained below, it 
may be useful for such information to be captured electronically 
particularly in rural areas where this requirement may prove prohibitive. 
Third, consistency between the regulations remains an issue. From our 
on-site discussions with the FIU it is understood that the provisions of the 
E-Money Regulations have been designed to be consistent with, and not 
replace, the AML/CFT Act. Furthermore, the FIU contributed to the design 
of the AML/CFT measures outlined in provisions in the E-Money 
 
 
 251. Id.  
 252. E-Money Regulations, § 30. In addition, there are limitations on registration requirements of 
accounts for customers in certain tiers (E-Money Regulations § 12(10)); e-money service providers 
must ensure their agents comply with AML laws, rules and regulations (E-Money Regulations, 
§ 12(12)); and agents must perform KYC/CDD procedures when registering new customers (E-Money 
Regulations, § 22(1)(d)). 
 253. Malawi Report, supra note 36, at 35. 
 254. As a separate point to consider, this section should possibly be applied to 30(1) (a), (b) and 
(c) instead of only being under 30(1)(a)(3) because this would make it clear that it applies to the 
capturing of identification irrespective of whether it is for Tier One, Two or Three. 
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Regulations.
255
 A policy statement may be required to clarify the 
interaction between the relative provisions of the two instruments. For 
example, it could be clarified how the provisions in the E-Money 
Regulations that allow for tiered KYC and electronic capturing of 
identification relate to the requirements in the AML/CFT Act.  
Finally, a policy statement could helpfully clarify how the CDD 
Directive relates to the AML/CFT Act and the E-Money Regulations. 
Effective implementation of KYC requirements and compliance with 
FATF guidelines will be furthered by a consistent application of a risk-
based approach to implementing AML/CFT measures for mobile money 
as set out in the three instruments, irrespective of whether a bank or non-
bank issues the e-money.  
C. Protection of Customers’ Funds 
1. Best Practice 
Protection of customers’ funds is an integral part of a targeted 
consumer protection framework for mobile money.
256
 This is because the 
funds which customers give to the mobile money provider in exchange for 
mobile money are not generally considered to be deposits and so are not 
covered by depositor protection provisions or deposit insurance.
257
 If 
stored without adequate protection, customers’ funds are at risk of loss 
through a number of means including theft, fraud, and general funds 
mismanagement (giving rise to liquidity and/or insolvency risks). 
Regulatory requirements focus on fund isolation, fund safekeeping, and 
operational risk management.
258
 
 
 
 255. Malawi Report, supra note 36, at 36. 
 256. See Michael Tarazi & Paul Breloff, Nonbank MNOs: Regulatory Approaches to Protecting 
Consumer Funds, CONSULTATIVE GRP. TO ASSIST THE POOR (2010), http://www.cgap.org/sites/ 
default/files/CGAP-Focus-Note-Nonbank-E-Money-Issuers-Regulatory-Approaches-to-Protecting-
Customer-Funds-Jul-2010.pdf; Lauer & Tarazi, supra note 33.  
 257. There is controversy in the literature as to whether stored value should be considered a 
deposit; however, for the purposes of analysing this regulatory challenge for Malawi it is assumed that 
e-money funds are not considered depositsconsistent with Malawi’s approach as outlined in its draft 
E-Money Regulations. See E-Money Regulations § 12.6. For background literature on this topic. See 
Tarazi & Breloff, supra note 256. 
 258. See Mobile Financial Services Working Group, Mobile Financial Services: Consumer 
Protection in MFS, ALLIANCE FOR FIN. INCLUSION (Mar. 2014), http://www.afi-global.org//library/ 
publications/mobile-financial-services-consumer-protection-mfs-2014. This is not to suggest this issue 
does not deserve the attention of regulators. On the contrary, it is expected that as the mobile money 
market develops the accompanying consumer protection framework will require significant 
development and strengthening. In particular, Malawian regulators should ensure an initial assessment 
is made, if not made already, as to whether existing consumer protection measures (such as appropriate 
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This part explores how trusts can be used to provide additional 
protection of customers’ funds that are held by MNOs. It draws heavily on 
a knowledge product written by Jonathan Greenacre and Professor Ross 
Buckley and supported by the Pacific Financial Inclusion Programme, 
titled Trust Law Protections for E-Money Customers: Lessons and a 
Model Trust Deed Arising from Mobile Money Deployments in the Pacific 
Islands (October 2013).
259
  
The use of trusts can provide three key protections to customers’ 
funds.
260
 The first is fund isolation, which addresses the problem of loss of 
customer or agent funds
261
 Usually, customers’ funds are stored in 
aggregate in one or more bank accounts in the name of the Provider, not 
the customers. This structure means that the Provider is the legal owner of 
the account and in the event of insolvency, the Provider can use the 
customers’ funds to pay off debts.262  
Fund isolation deals with this problem by requiring the Provider to 
store customers’ funds in a separate account—usually a trust account in a 
bank.
263
 Declaring a trust over the funds which are held in this separate 
bank account, enables the customer to retain the beneficial ownership of 
the funds.
264
 In other words, customers’ funds are held separately and are 
legally isolated from the assets of the Provider. As such, the funds cannot 
be claimed by third party creditors should the Provider become 
insolvent.
265
 
The second is fund safeguarding rules which aim to minimise both the 
loss of agents’ or customers’ funds and illiquidity risk.266 These rules aim 
 
 
disclosures requirements and redress mechanisms for consumer complaints) apply to EMSPs or if 
regulations need to be amended to ensure these measures apply to EMSPs. The recently-released 
document Mobile Financial Services: Consumer Protection in MFS (2014) developed by the AFI’s 
Mobile Financial Services Working Group, released in March 2014, provides a framework of analysis 
for identifying these issues and presents options for regulators in addressing the issues.  
 259.  Jonathan Greenacre & Ross Buckley, Trust Law Protections for E-Money Customers: 
Lessons and a Model Trust Deed Arising from Mobile Money Deployments in the Pacific Islands, 
ALLIANCE FOR FIN. INCLUSION (Oct. 2013), http://www.afi-global.org/sites/default/files/publications/ 
piwg_knowledge_product_e-money_trust_and_model_trust_deed.pdf. 
 260. Id. at 10. 
 261. Id.  
 262. Tarazi & Breloff, supra note 256, at 6. 
 263. Greenacre & Buckley, supra note 260, at 10.  
 264. JOHN MOWBRAY ET AL., LEWIN ON TRUSTS 3 (17th ed. 2000). The distinction between 
beneficial owner and legal owner is an important one, and should be carefully considered. Equity 
allows the use and benefit of the land to be held separately from the legal title. Thus, even if the legal 
title to property is held by one person, another person may enjoy the ‘beneficial title.’ Beneficial 
ownership can only be recognised in courts of equity and not by the common law.  
 265. Tarazi & Breloff, supra note 256, at 6. 
 266. Greenacre & Buckley, supra note 260, at 11–12. 
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to ensure the Provider always has a 1:1 ratio between e-money and the e-
money issued (e-float).
267
 Maintaining this 1:1 ratio means that the 
Provider will always have enough funds to repay the customers when they 
want to cash out their remaining e-money.
268
 Three main categories of 
rules aim to achieve the 1:1 ratio: liquidity rules, restrictions on the use of 
customers’ funds, and diversification of the e-float.269  
The third is an active regulator which is designed to reduce operational 
risk by giving a regulator powers to monitor whether the EMSP is 
complying with the terms of the trust deed, including auditing 
requirements.
270
 This protection is required because operational risk can 
arise in various ways such as theft, misuse, negligence, or poor 
administration and so may not be addressed purely through auditing 
requirements.
271
  
In a trust arrangement, the beneficiaries (in this case mobile money 
customers) are usually responsible for monitoring whether the EMSP is 
complying with the terms of the trust deed.
272
 This traditional trust 
arrangement may not be workable in these circumstances because mobile 
money is the first sustained interaction many Malawians will have with 
formal financial services. They will not be educated and experienced in 
trust-related rules and principles.
273
  
2. In Practice 
At the time of our country study, both MNOs in Malawi stored 
customers’ funds in a trust account at a commercial bank.274 Under the E-
Money Regulations, the EMSP is required to open a trust account at one or 
more commercial banks, and a variety of provisions outline how these 
accounts should be operated.
275
 Specific rules are analysed below. 
 
 
 267. Id. at 11 
 268. Id.  
 269. Tarazi & Breloff, supra note 256, at 3–6. 
 270. Id. at 13.  
 271. Id. at 9.  
 272. In turn this is because of their power to enforce the terms of the trust by suing the EMSP (as 
trustee) for breaches of the trust’s terms.  
 273. See generally Denise Dias & Katharine McKee, Protecting Branchless Banking Consumers: 
Policy Objectives and Regulatory Options, CONSULTATIVE GRP. TO ASSIST THE POOR (Sept. 2012), 
http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/fn_64_rev_d_10.pdf. 
 274. Mapping the Retail Payment Services Landscape: Malawi, FINMARK TRUST 19 (Oct. 2012), 
http://www.finmark.org.za/wp-content/uploads/pubs/Rep_RPS_landscape_Malawi_2012.pdf. The 
authors of this article have provided earlier comments to RBM on how this topic is dealt with in the 
E-Money Regulations. 
 275. See, e.g., E-Money Regulations, § 12(14-15). 
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3. Analysis 
The RBM could use the E-Money Regulations to implement trust-based 
protections for customer funds through several methods. First, it could 
require the EMSP to use a trust deed with a declaration of trust which can 
create the fund isolation protection. RBM could then direct that this deed 
contain certain provisions relating to liquidity, restrictions on the use of 
customers’ funds, and diversification which can create the fund 
safeguarding protection. Finally, the regulations could provide RBM with 
authority to monitor the EMSP’s compliance with the terms of the trust 
deed which in turn can reduce operational risk.  
However, these suggestions should be carefully considered as several 
implementation challenges may arise. First, a holistic approach is 
necessary. It should be considered whether or not the suggestions 
duplicate or contravene pre-existing methods of protecting customers’ 
funds. For example, many of the suggested protections relating to fund 
safeguarding may already be contained in non-trust related documents, 
such as the contract between the customer and EMSP and it may be worth 
considering whether these could be enhanced. 
Secondly, like any country, trust-related laws in Malawi will be 
complex and drawn from a range of sources, including legislation, 
regulation, and case law. How trust protections in the mobile money sector 
can be implemented in ways that are consistent with this area of law will 
need to be considered. Further, the trade-off between minimising risk and 
regulatory burden needs to be assessed; a proportionate risk-based 
approach should be followed where possible. It should also be borne in 
mind that additional regulatory costs may discourage EMSPs from 
expanding their services into rural areas of Malawi, or providing e-money 
altogether; however, the importance of proper customer protection 
provisions cannot be underestimated in building customer trust and 
ensuring the delivery of effective services.  
Trust provisions could be inserted directly into the 
E-Money Regulations either directly or through a ‘model trust deed’ 
attached to the E-Money Regulations as a template which EMSPs must 
use. A sample trust deed is attached to the Trust knowledge product we 
drafted.
276
 Under this approach, the trust deed could function effectively as 
a rule book which contains all fund isolation, fund safeguarding, and 
operational risk protections that apply to customers’ funds. These rules 
 
 
 276. Greenacre & Buckley, supra note 260.  
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could consist of duties on the EMSP which are both express (i.e. explicitly 
contained in the trust deed) and implied (i.e. the court could infer a duty if 
it is required to fill a gap in the trust deed). Setting out the provisions in 
such a way may make it easier for RBM to monitor whether the EMSP is 
complying with its obligations to protect customers’ funds.  
a. Method 1: Fund Isolation  
As outlined earlier, under the E-Money Regulations, an EMSP is 
required to open a trust account at a commercial bank.
277
 However, this 
requirement will only create the necessary fund isolation protection if a 
court finds sufficient evidence of an intention to create a trust relationship 
between the customer and EMSP. Storing customers’ funds in a trust 
account is likely to be sufficient evidence to establish such an intention, 
but it may not be beyond doubt.  
The E-Money Regulations could enhance fund isolation protection by 
requiring the EMSP to use a trust deed and include a declaration of trust as 
one of the provisions in the trust deed which specifies that the EMSP holds 
customers’ funds on trust for the customer. These requirements would 
generally be sufficient to establish that a trust relationship does exist 
between two parties. 
b. Method 2: Fund Safeguarding  
The E-Money Regulations provide rules relating to how the trust 
account must be operated. These fund safeguarding rules can reduce 
liquidity risk (by ensuring the EMSP maintains sufficient liquidity) and 
operational risk (by requiring the EMSP to have adequate safeguards in 
place to protect customers’ funds).  
In order to further strengthen the protection of customers’ funds, the E-
Money Regulations could require the trust deed to include additional fund 
safeguarding provisions on the use of trust funds. These can take the form 
of trustee duties specifying that the EMSP must pay all customers’ funds 
into the trust account and that customers’ funds cannot be used to finance 
the EMSP’s operating expenses. The trustee duties could further specify 
that customers are entitled to their funds when they seek to cash-in an 
equivalent amount of e-money, and that the EMSP must return customers’ 
funds if the trust is terminated.
278
 
 
 
 277. See, eg., E-Money Regulations, § 12(14-15). 
 278. E-Money Regulations, § 11(5), 38. Note that RBM has certain powers to require RBM to 
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c. Method 3: Reduce Operational Risk through an ‘Active 
Regulator’  
The E-Money Regulations grant RBM extensive monitoring powers 
over the EMSP’s accounts, including the trust account, through for 
example auditing requirements for the EMSP, and powers of RBM to 
verify such audits.
279
 These provisions can enable RBM to detect theft of 
customers’ funds.  
The E-Money Regulations could potentially provide RBM with more 
extensive powers to monitor and enforce the terms of the trust on behalf of 
the customers, such as providing RBM with the powers, responsibilities, 
and duties involved in operating as a ‘protector.’280 This involves giving 
an entity—in this case the RBM—the authority to oversee the actions of 
the Provider (as trustee of the trust in which customers’ funds are held).281 
This would enable the regulator to monitor the extent to which the 
Provider is storing and protecting customers’ funds.282 
Where these powers already exist in the E-Money Regulations, they 
could be moved into the model trust deed proposed above. Protector 
powers, responsibilities, and duties include requiring RBM to comply with 
a number of duties when serving as a protector, specifically to act in the 
best interests of customers,
283
 to require the EMSP to provide it with 
additional audits of the trust account,
284
 to remove an EMSP as trustee of 
the trust where it deems this necessary,
285
 to refuse to provide consent to 
the EMSP’s proposed application to appoint a new person as a trustee,286 
 
 
repay customers’ funds. This power may authorise RBM to require the EMSP to pay customers’ funds 
to customers if the fund is terminated. However, RBM may also want a more specific requirement on 
EMSPs.  
 279. E-Money Regulations, § 12(3, 4, 20, and 21), 34, 35.  
 280. Antony Duckworth, Protectors: Law & Practice, 19(1) TRUSTS & TRUSTEES 98, 100 (2010). 
 281. Id. at 100. 
 282.  Note that protectors are used in types of trusts, particularly in jurisdictions where investors 
are concerned about the trustworthiness of companies holding funds on their behalf. See Matthew 
Conalgen & Elizabeth Weaver, Protectors as Fiduciaries: Theory & Practice, 18(1) TRUSTS & 
TRUSTEES 17, 20 (2012); see also Richard Ausness, The Role of Trust Protectors in American Trust 
Law, 45 REAL PROP. TRUSTS & ESTATE L.J. 319 (2010); Tsun Tey, Trust Protector, 20 SINGAPORE 
ACADEMY OF LAW JOURNAL 99 (2008); Alexander Bove, The Case Against the Trust Protector, 25 
PROBATE & PROPERTY 50 (2011).  
 283. See, e.g., Bove, supra note 282; Conalgen & Weaver, supra note 282; Ausness, supra note 
282. 
 284. Note that this power exists in E-Money Regulations, § 12(21) but RBM may wish to demand 
such audits at will without having to prescribe them. See E-Money Regulations, § 12(21). 
 285. This power may exist in E-Money Regulations, § 6(2), 10(1), but should be made clearer 
through revised drafting. See E-Money Regulations, § 6(2), 10(1). 
 286. Id.  
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and to revoke an EMSP’s approval to provide e-money for failing to 
operate in the interests of the customers.
287
 RMB could further have the 
power to refuse to agree to the EMSP’s application to amend the trust 
deed,
288
 to refuse to provide consent to the EMSP’s application to 
terminate or wind up the trust, and to enforce the terms of the trust on 
behalf of the customers, including by suing the trustee.
289
 
To conclude this analysis, scope for using trusts in Malawi as a means 
of protecting customers’ funds raises three main issues. First, a trust 
relationship cannot be automatically assumed to apply between the 
Provider and customers. The trust relationship needs to be specifically 
established by requiring a Provider to use a trust deed with a declaration of 
trust. Second, a regulator needs to ensure that the trust deed has the right 
fund safeguarding provisions. Third, in a developing country such as 
Malawi, many customers will have low levels of education and financial 
literacy, which implies that a regulator needs active powers to monitor the 
trust account on the customers’ behalf to ensure protections are effective.  
D. Regulatory Implications of Partnerships Between MNOs and 
Banks/MFIs 
1. Best Practice 
In MNO-bank/MFI partnerships, customers holding a mobile money 
account with the MNO and a deposit account with the partner bank or MFI 
are able to transfer money between these accounts.
290
 Partnerships may 
also involve more basic cooperation where mobile money customers are 
able to use a partner bank’s ATM to withdraw money.291 Partnerships 
between non-banks and banks within the mobile money space are 
therefore beneficial on a number of fronts.
292
 Partnerships can assist in 
 
 
 287. Similar powers exist in E-Money Regulations, § 11(i-j). See E-Money Regulations, § 11(i-j). 
 288. Similar powers exist in E-Money Regulations, § 12(16). See E-Money Regulations, § 12(16). 
 289. The RBM can take various actions in the event of revocation of approval (E-Money 
Regulations, § 11(5-9) and can impose various penalties on the trustee (E-Money Regulations § 37), 
but is not specifically authorised to sue on behalf of the beneficiaries. See also Tey, supra note 282.  
 290. Malawi Report, supra note 36, at 42. 
 291. See Nicole Cassandra Naidoo, MTN, Ecobank Partner in Mobile Money Venture, CNBC 
AFRICA (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.cnbcafrica.com/news/technology/2014/03/17/mtn,-ecobank-
partner-in-mobile-money-venture. MTN recently announced that its mobile money customers in 12 
African countries will soon be able to use Ecobank ATMs to withdraw money. The countries include 
Benin, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, the Republic of Guinea, Liberia, Congo 
Brazzaville, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda and Zambia.  
 292. See Neil Davidson, Mapping and Effectively Structuring Operator-Bank Relationships to 
Offer Mobile Money for the Unbanked, GSMA (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.gsma.com/mobile for 
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addressing regulatory concerns; the pool of funds held by a non-bank may 
be reduced as end-users are able to transfer funds into deposit accounts at 
a bank; bank accounts are subject to well-established depositor protection 
provisions; and partnerships enable a broader range of product offerings 
beyond bill payments and remittance activities to providing customers 
with services such as savings, credit, and insurance. However, partnerships 
between non-banks and banks give rise to potential risks which regulators 
need to assess when considering whether to grant approval of 
partnerships.
293
 Two central issues for regulators to consider include: 
collaboration risk, and consumer protection issues arising from the greater 
range of product offerings being available via a mobile phone. 
Partnerships between MNOs and banks/MFIs can be structured in a 
number of ways and this raises risks specific to the method of 
collaboration.
294
 The two entities can enter into a legal partnership, but are 
in practice unlikely to want to do so because in law, partners are liable for 
each other’s obligations. The more likely structure to be adopted is 
therefore some form of joint venture. Joint ventures can be incorporated 
which means a new corporate legal entity is created in which the MNO 
and bank or MFI would each hold shares. Alternatively they can be 
unincorporated, which means that although the two entities conduct 
business together this is not through the vehicle of a new legal entity, i.e. 
the unincorporated joint venture remains two entities working together. 
The limitation of an incorporated joint venture from a regulatory point of 
view is that the venture will only have whatever assets the shareholders 
inject into it. This may raise concerns as it may not be a substantial 
organisation in financial terms. For this reason, regulators may prefer an 
unincorporated joint venture or may ask that the shareholders give 
guarantees of the liability of an incorporated joint venture. 
Consumer protection issues which arise as a result of a greater range of 
product offerings being available via a mobile phone need careful 
assessment by the regulator. Ideally, this should occur prior to potential 
issues arising for the end-users which may deter their further use of formal 
financial services. For example, by providing loans to customers of the 
 
 
development/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/mappingandeffectivestructuringfinal2643.pdf; R. Sultana, 
Mobile Banking: Overview of Regulatory Framework in Emerging Markets 14 (Communication Policy 
Research, South Conference, Negombo, Sri Lanka, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1554160.  
 293. See Tarazi & Breloff, supra note 256.  
 294. See generally Ignacio Mas, Enabling Different Paths to the Development of Mobile Money 
Ecosystems, GSMA (May 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1843623; Lyman, Pickens & Porteous, 
supra note 2.  
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MNO-bank/MFI partnerships, the partnership needs to be wary of 
excessive interest rate charges or poor credit risk assessments which may 
lead to client indebtedness and potential loan defaults.
295
  
2. In Practice 
As outlined above, Airtel and TNM are now partnering with banks and 
MFIs in Malawi to add greater depth to mobile money product offerings 
and leverage on existing agent networks established by the banks and 
MFIs. For example, Airtel operates a partnership with Opportunity Bank 
(an MFI).
296
 TNM is piloting a partnership with First Merchant Bank.
297
 
The RBM is yet to determine a regulatory and supervisory approach for 
MNO-bank/MFI partnerships and regulation from other areas, such as 
competition, has yet to be applied. There is therefore a clear need to assess 
the regulatory requirements for the governance of such partnerships and to 
formulate the appropriate regulatory provisions. 
3. Analysis 
Partnerships between non-banks and banks within the mobile money 
space are beneficial because they can address regulatory concerns and 
allow for deeper product offerings, from bill payments and remittance 
activities to providing customers with a greater range of services, 
including savings, credit, and insurance. Regulators need to be aware of 
the implications of regulated entities entering into such partnerships and 
respond accordingly. Regulators will need to assess a number of factors 
including the proposed legal nature of the partnership and the risks this 
potentially gives rise to, which we refer to as collaboration risk. 
Partnerships will also raise consumer protection issues as a result of 
 
 
 295. See a discussion of high interest rates in banking from Charles A. Bruch, Taking the Pay Out 
of Payday Loans: Putting an End to the Usurious and Unconscionable Interest Rates Charged by 
Payday Lenders, 69 UNI. CIN. L. REV. 1257 (2001). High interest rates and customer overindebtedness 
has contributed to micro-credit market meltdowns in a number of countries such as Morocco, 
Nicaragua, Pakistan. See Milford Bateman & Ha-Joon Chang, Microfinance and the Illusion of 
Development: From Hubris to Nemesis in Thirty Years 1(1) WORLD ECONOMIC REVIEW 13, 16 
(2012). Perhaps the most spectacular example of this process was the 2010 micro-credit market 
meltdown in Andhra Pradesh: Oya Ardic, Joyce Ibrahim & Nataliya Mylenko, Consumer Protection 
Laws and Regulations in Deposit and Loan Services: A Cross-Country Analysis with a New Data Set, 
THE WORLD BANK 2 (Jan. 2011), http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-Consumer-Protection-
Laws-and-Regulations-in-Deposit-and-Loan-Services-Jan-2011.pdf. 
 296. Malawi Report, supra note 36, at 13. 
 297. Id.  
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consumers potentially having access to a much broader range of financial 
services via a mobile phone than simply mobile money.  
It would be beneficial at this stage of market development for the RBM 
to engage in ongoing dialogue with industry players in order to follow 
developments in partnerships. This will ensure that RBM is able to 
develop an appropriate oversight approach which supports the benefits 
from partnerships but also responds to any additional risks which may 
arise. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Mobile money products and services are an important tool in providing 
access to financial services for the unbanked and under-banked, thereby 
helping to alleviate poverty. Regulators need to assess emerging risks and 
sector developments. Research and on-the-ground experience suggests an 
enabling proportionate-based approach is appropriate for the task of 
designing effective regulatory frameworks for mobile money.  
This Article outlines the findings of a study of the mobile money sector 
in Malawi conducted by the research team at the University of New South 
Wales (UNSW). The purposes of this study were to assist regulatory 
agencies to develop an appropriate enabling legal and regulatory 
environment for service providers and end-users in Malawi’s mobile 
money sector. It was hoped that by crafting a tailored regulatory 
environment, this would encourage further development in the sector 
which would enhance the achievement of the Government’s financial 
inclusion and poverty reduction objectives. Insights from this study 
provide a better understanding of the challenges of implementing 
emerging best practices on the enabling approach and proportionate 
regulation in a developing country environment, as well as helping to 
identify current gaps in understanding of the risks and challenges involved 
in the growth of the sector. The study identified seven key themes of 
regulatory development. 
The first topic is the importance of establishing co-ordination among 
regulators and between regulators and industry in relation to mobile 
money. Malawi’s regulators, particularly the RBM, have made 
considerable progress in this regard, indicating their adoption of emerging 
international best practice on this topic.  
The second topic is the need for a regulator to clarify that its regulatory 
mandate extends to mobile money. Malawi’s key mobile money-related 
regulation, the E-Money Regulations and Payments Bill, contain 
inconsistent use of important terminology, particularly ‘mobile money’ 
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and ‘e-money’, which leads to confusion over the scope of the RBM’s 
mandate over mobile money. This suggests that additional guidance is 
needed on the meaning of these terms and that this meaning needs to be 
conveyed to regulators so that it can be appropriately specified in 
regulatory documents. A document released by the Alliance for Financial 
Inclusion, titled Mobile Financial Services: Basic Terminology (2013) 
could be a useful framework for such a process.  
The third area is a regulator’s role in understanding and building 
consumer demand for mobile money. The considerable efforts of 
Malawian regulators and policy makers, particularly the RBM, in 
understanding and building consumer demand suggests that this 
component of international research can be implemented in practice.  
The fourth component relates to the regulation of agents. Malawi’s 
experience with building agent networks highlights the importance of 
regulatory freedom when a mobile money sector is in the early stages of 
development. In Malawi, the two MNOs need to determine how to 
continue building their networks and to overcome the challenges they face 
in doing so, particularly agent illiquidity and the expenses required for 
training and retraining. Important provisions of Malawi’s E-Money 
Regulations provide a degree of flexibility in this regard, in particular by 
making the Provider liable for its agents’ actions rather than requiring the 
RBM to regulate agents directly itself. This regulatory flexibility must be 
balanced with effective regulatory monitoring of risks that have arisen in 
relation to agent activity in other countries, such as agent robbery and 
agent misconduct, particularly theft. Additional research is required to 
establish the appropriate balance with respect to regulating the use of 
agents. Our UNSW research team anticipates undertaking such research in 
the near future. 
The fifth involves challenges of implementing proportionate regulation 
in relation to AML/CFT. The lack of a national identification system and 
the difficulty of obtaining photocopies of identity documents in rural areas 
of Malawi help us better understand the challenges developing countries 
face in designing even basic identification standards that are compliant 
with KYC rules but not unduly burdensome such as to constrain growth in 
the sector. In this respect, the need to comply with KYC rules has to be 
carefully balanced against the policy objective of furthering financial 
inclusion such that requirements that are workable in a developing 
economy environment can be identified. Furthermore, the different KYC 
rules in Malawi’s AML/CFT legislation remind us of the importance of 
ensuring regulatory consistency.  
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Sixth, Malawi’s use of trusts as a legal means of protecting customers’ 
funds helps to identify three important issues that a country needs to 
address when using this tool: a trust relationship needs to be established by 
requiring a Provider to use a trust deed with a declaration of trust; the trust 
deed must contain the necessary fund safeguarding provisions; and in a 
country like Malawi where many customers will have low levels of 
education and financial literacy, it is important that the regulator has active 
powers to oversee the trust relationship.  
The seventh relates to MNO-bank/MFI partnerships in mobile money. 
These partnerships are at an early stage in Malawi and other countries as 
they are a reasonably new development. Consequently, there is limited 
research on this topic; however, it is clear that Malawi and other countries 
will need to carefully assess developments in MNO-bank/MFI 
partnerships, including a specific focus on any particular risks that they 
may generate. We will conduct further research in this area with the 
objective of improving existing knowledge and awareness of the 
regulatory challenges that arise from MNO-bank/MFI partnerships in 
DFS. 
In conclusion, Malawi’s mobile money sector is a new development, 
having started just a few years ago. Malawi has therefore been in the 
fortunate position of being able to draw upon experience in other markets, 
and as a result its regulatory arrangements appear to be well geared 
towards the continued safe growth of mobile money in the country. The 
legislative and regulatory changes currently being proposed in Malawi, the 
Payments Bill and draft E-Money Regulations, respond to the need to 
develop the mobile money market safely and in a way which responds 
positively to the needs of end-users, and thereby furthers financial 
inclusion objectives.  
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VI. APPENDIX: LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
ACL Access Communications Limited 
AFI Alliance for Financial Inclusion 
Airtel Bharti Airtel 
AML Anti-money laundering 
AMPI African Mobile Phone Financial Services 
Policy Initiative 
ATM Automatic teller machine 
BTCA Better Than Cash Alliance 
CBA Commercial Bank of Africa 
CDD Customer due diligence 
CDD Directive Customer Due Diligence for Banks and 
Financial Institutions, Directive 2005 
CFT Countering the financing of terrorism 
CFTC Competition and Fair Trading Commission 
CGAP Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
CGAP Template Consultative Group to Assist the Poor’s 
Branchless Banking Diagnostic 
Template 
DFS Digital financial services 
ECA United Nation’s Economic Commission 
for Africa 
EMSP E-money service provider 
FATF Financial Action Task Force 
FHI 360 World Bank and Family Health 
International 360 
FIU Financial Intelligence Unit 
GDP Gross domestic product 
G2P Government-to-person 
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KYC Know your customer 
MACRA Malawi Communications Regulatory 
Authority 
MFI Microfinance institutions 
ML Money laundering 
MMCG Mobile Money Consultative Group 
MNO Mobile Network Operators 
MOF Ministry of Finance 
MOU Memorandum of understanding 
MPC Malawi Postal Corporation 
MTL Malawi Telecommunications Limited 
MM4P Mobile Money for the Poor 
NGO Non-government organization 
NPC National Payments Council 
NPPS New payments products and services 
P2G Person-to-government 
RBM Reserve Bank of Malawi 
RBM-MF/CM         
Department 
Reserve Bank of Malawi’s Micro-finance 
and Capital Markets Department 
SIM Subscriber Identification Module 
SMS Short message service 
TF Terrorist financing 
TNM Telekom Networks Malawi Limited 
UNCTAD United Nation’s Conference on Trade and 
Development 
USAID US Agency for Development 
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